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Abstract
We study frictionless matching models in large production economies
with and without market imperfections and/or incentive problems. We
provide necessary and sufficient distribution-free conditions for monotone
matching which depend on the relationship between what we call the segre-
gation payoff — a generalization of the individually rational payoff — and
the feasible set for a pair of types. Our approach yields some new techniques
for computing equilibria, particularly when utility is not transferable. It
also helps to underscore the effects of imperfections, which have two dis-
tinct effects that are relevant for equilibrium matching patterns: they can
overwhelm the complementarity properties of the production technology
and they can introduce nontransferabilities that make equilibrium match-
ing inefficient. We also use our framework to reveal the source of differences
in the comparative static properties of some models in the literature and
to explore the effects of distribution on the equilibrium matching pattern.
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1. Introduction
Ever since Roy [22] and Tinbergen [27] used them to study the distribution of
earnings, matching (or assignment) models have proved to be remarkably adapt-
able to the study a wide range of problems.1 Early applications of these models
(as well as some more recent ones) tended to be to environments in which there
were no market imperfections: the only departure from standard Arrow-Debreu
assumptions was the presence of an indivisibility in agents' characteristics that
make a matching problem relevant. Many more recent applications — including
for example community stratification, education financing, international trade,
organizational design, or the market for ownership and control ([2], [9], [5],[16],
[18]) — also involve some sort of imperfection arising from a missing market or
an information asymmetry.
Among the main insights of the early literature was a fundamental mono-
tonicity result. In the presence of complementarities there is positive assortative
matching: more able individuals are assigned to more productive tasks or to more
able individuals. Monotone matching patterns of this kind are compelling both
because of their empirical appeal and because they greatly facilitate computa-
tion of the equilibrium. Indeed, in the minds of most economists, the connection
among efficiency, positive assortative matching and complementarities is probably
the main idea of the matching literature.
But while this connection has been established for cases in which there are
no market imperfections, it is unclear to what extent it carries over to the more
general environments that have attracted recent attention. Some examples sug-
gest that complementarities in the production technology alone need not entail
positive assortative matching.2 Moreover, the presence of market imperfections
leads to the possibility that matches may not be efficient, at least in the sense of
maximizing social surplus. Our purpose here is to provide necessary and sufficient
conditions for monotone matching in some of these more general environments.
These conditions facilitate computation of equilibria (including those in classical
environments) and help with an assessment of the impact of imperfections on
matching.
The standard argument for positive assortative matching goes something like
lSome other classic references are Becker [1], Gale-Shapley [10], Roth-Sotomayor [21] , and
Sattinger [24]. Sattinger [25] provides a fine survey of the "classical" literature.
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 For instance, Legros-Newman [16] study a model of firm formation and find that when
capital markets are perfect, matches are segregated, while when capital markets are imperfect,
there may be negative assortative matching.
this. Consider two workers of abilities a# > aL and two firms with productivities
i>H > &L- All agents have payoffs which are linear in income. Complementarity in
production means that the output gain when a^ switches from &L to bu is smaller
than that gained when a# makes the same switch. Therefore, a# can outbid a^
for the more productive firm and, in an efficient (or competitive or core) allocation
of such an economy, aH matches with bu and a^ matches with bL : we get positive
assortative matching.
Notice two crucial assumptions. The obvious one is complementarity, which
arises quite naturally in production situations; most neoclassical production tech-
nologies display this property. But what matters for positive assortative matching
is complementarity in the joint payoffs; this immediately leads us to ask what hap-
pens in the presence of market imperfections, when payoffs and output are not
always the same thing. Suppose, for instance that outside financing of a project
is possible only if the joint output exceeds a certain minimum level (many models
of imperfect financial markets have this or a similar property); then negative as-
sortative matching (in which the high firm matches with the low worker and vice
versa) may be the outcome of competition and may even be optimal. Thus im-
perfections may affect the complementarity properties of the joint payoff in ways
that overwhelm the effects of the technology.
Second, and less obvious perhaps, is the implicit assumption that there is full
transferability of utility between the partners in a match. In order for a# to
outbid aL for bHl she may have to pay to bn the full marginal gain from matching
with bf{ rather than bL. But if there are incentive problems (suppose it is harder
to detect more able workers when they shirk, so inducing effort requires paying
them a large rent), transferring too much income to the high productivity firm
may destroy her incentives, so she may only be able to match with the lower (and
cheaper) firm. The outcome might be inefficient in the sense that a social planner
could generate higher total output by forcing a new match and requiring high
productivity firms to accept less than their equilibrium income.
In order to handle these two effects of market imperfections — changes to the
complementarity properties of the joint payoff and reductions in transferability
— the appropriate object to look at is the utility possibility set for each possible
partnership: in other words, we are interested in the characteristic function of a
cooperative game representing the matching problem. To describe the outcome
on this game (we will use the core as our equilibrium concept) requires that we
characterize the equilibrium match and the corresponding equilibrium utilities of
all the agents.
In practice, such a characterization is difficult. Nevertheless, as we will show, a
lot of information about the comparative statics in technological and informational
parameters of equilibrium can be obtained by analyzing changes in the feasible
utility sets and in what we call the segregation payoffs. The segregation payoff for
an individual is the equilibrium payoff to this individual in an economy consisting
solely of individuals of the same type as himself.
Our analysis follows a simple economic logic. One normally thinks of an equi-
librium as a situation in which individuals' current benefits exceed their outside
options. Occasionally, some individuals' equilibrium outside option is equal to
the segregation payoff, but this will not be true in general. Nevertheless, we use
the segregation payoff as a lower bound on the outside option and compare it to
the utility possibility obtained in different matches. Doing so we have a natural
concept of "gains from trade" (more precisely gains from a heterogeneous match).
It is the comparative static of these gains from trade that will tell us much about
the equilibrium outcome. For example, it helps to indicate situations in which
individuals of very different types match together — despite strong complementar-
ities in the production technology — because one type has a very low segregation
payoff.
Within this framework, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for
monotone matching to occur for any distribution of characteristics. All of them
rely on the same kind of logic: positive matching requires that there be no nega-
tive matches (i.e. if a > b > c > d, we cannot have a matched with d and b with
c). Thus, if four types are matched in a negative way, it must be possible for two
of them to improve upon the payoffs they are getting in the negative match. This
simple observation places restrictions on the characteristic function which are rel-
atively easy to verify. For instance, in the case of transferable utility, we obtain
a direct weakening — known as weak increasing differences — of the standard
complementarity conditions on the joint payoff (Proposition 4). In the nontrans-
ferable utility case, our necessary and sufficient condition for positive matching
(Condition P and Proposition 6) describes those characteristic functions which
will not admit a stable negative match.
For the set of nontransferable utility models in which the Pareto frontiers of the
feasible sets are strictly decreasing, we obtain a sufficient condition for monotone
matching which, although founded on the same kind of logic, is entirely new.
In this case, one can describe the frontiers by invertible functions. A sufficient
condition for positive matching then turns out to be that the graphs of certain
fourfold compositions of these functions always lie below the forty-five-degree
line (Proposition 10). This condition is amenable to analytic and/or numerical
verification and should therefore help to render tractable a wider class of matching
models (for instance, those with risk averse agents).
We employ these results to analyze several extended examples, some of which
are taken from the recent literature and some of which are new. We study two
imperfect markets examples, making use of our results on monotone matching to
help compute equilibria. More substantively, we illustrate the points made above
about the two effects of imperfections on matching. In one case, a financial market
imperfection swamps the complementarity in production, resulting for instance in
situations in which nonmonotonic matching (mixtures of positive and negative
assortative matching) may occur. Thus, positive assortative matching is not a
universal prediction of matching models, even when it is known that technology
is complementary.
Another feature of this example is that despite being derived from a market
imperfection, payoffs remain fully transferable within coalitions. A consequence
of this fact is that matching, though no longer necessarily monotonic, is always
optimal.
A second model we study illustrates the reduced transferability effect of imper-
fections. In the context of a production model with moral hazard, a very strong
form of positive matching, known as segregation, in which agents match only with
agents of their own type, emerges despite the fact that it is not efficient: a so-
cial planner could increase the economy's output by reassigning people to other
types. The incentive problem prevents the winners in such a reassignment from
compensating the losers, which is why it doesn't happen in equilibrium. Similar
arguments have been made for example with respect to school choice [2], [9]. Here
though, the inefficiency stems solely from lack of transferability within coalitions,
and has nothing to do with there being too few towns for the number of types
or other "external" effects. The example also shows that positive assortative
matching may not constitute reliable evidence of an efficient matching process.
Of course the utility of our results is not limited to economies with imperfec-
tions. They can be helpful in understanding some comparative static properties of
different "perfect-world" models. For example, consider Becker's [1] model of the
marriage market. There are two tasks, 1 and 2; if a^  is the ability of the individual
performing task z, output is /i(ai,a2); ability is complementary: h has positive
cross partial derivatives throughout. Individuals are distinguished on the basis
of their gender i = 1,2; men perform task 1, women perform task 2. It is well
known that the matching in this model is always positive assortative. Moreover,
for a given distribution of abilities, the equilibrium matching pattern is invariant
to the choice of h as long as h has the complementarity property.
Kremer [14] and Kremer and Maskin [15] use a similar model to study in-
come distribution. The first paper uses h {0,1,0,2) = 0,^2 while the second uses
h (ai, ^2) — rnax{aja2, a\a\). In the first case there is perfect segregation: in equi-
librium, each firm consists of a single type of worker. In the second case, firms will
not be segregated; in particular, if the support of the distribution is tight enough,
the best worker will match with the median worker and the others will match in a
positive assortative way. The change in the matching pattern can only have come
from the difference in the production function. As we know, this cannot happen
in Becker's model.
Why the dramatic difference in comparative statics? In both models, a worker's
willingness to pay for a partner depends on the difference between what he achieves
with a partner and his segregation payoff (we call this difference, when positive,
the "surplus"). But there is an important distinction between the two models.
In Becker's case, if two people of the same gender match together they receive a
payoff of zero irrespective of their abilities. Therefore the gains from a heteroge-
neous match relative to the segregation payoffs are fully described by the output
function h. Every man would like to match with the ablest woman, but it is the
ablest man who is willing to pay the most. This fact is independent of the specific
form of h. By contrast, in Kremer-Maskin, the segregation payoff is positive, and
so the surplus varies with ability and with the choice of h in nonmonotonic ways.
Therefore the individuals do not unanimously rank the other individuals and the
pattern of matching will be more complex and more sensitive to the specifics of the
technology and type distribution. We show that a general property of two-sided
matching models (such as Becker's) is that matching will be invariant to changes
in technology as long as complementarity is preserved. We also derive a sufficient
condition (the "single trough surplus condition") for one-sided matching models
(such as Kremer's) which lead to a similar pattern. The latter condition is more
vulnerable to changes in the technology, which helps explain why the one-sided
models have more complex comparative statics than the two-sided models.
Another issue that has attracted some attention recently is the dependence
of the pattern of matching on the distribution of types [15]. In fact, it is clear
in general that the match must depend on the distribution, if only in the sense
that the correspondence m(a) which sends a type a into the type(s) with which
it matches will not be invariant to the distribution (think of the example above
in which say bL increases slightly to b^ < bn'- Tn{ai) will change from b^ to
bL). Of course, requiring that m(a) be invariant is very demanding (Condition
S below is necessary and sufficient for this kind of invariance). At the other
extreme, we might only require that monotonicity of the match be preserved, for
which our Conditions P and N are necessary and sufficient. In between, these
conditions don't help directly, but reveal a lot about the structure of particular
models and make them easier to solve. To this end, we study the model of
Kremer and Maskin, showing how their main result on the effect of distribution
of the degree of segregation is easily understood as a consequence of the shape
of the surplus functions. Their model always has monotone matching, however,
and the dependence of matching on distribution is reflected in cardinal measures
of changes in the matching map m(a). A more striking dependence of matching
on distribution occurs in our imperfect financial market example: changes to the
type distribution can cause the match to go from positive to negative assortative,
and typically there will be a nonmonotonic mix of the two.
2. Theory
2.1. Notation
The economies we study have a continuum of agents who are designated by the
set / = [0,1] x [0,1] with Lebesgue measure. The description of a specific economy
includes an assignment of individuals to types via a map r : / > T, where the
"type space" T is taken to be a compact subset of some Euclidean space with
the usual order. The map r is measurable. We also assume that any two agents
with the same first coordinate get assigned the same type by r: if i = (x,y) and
j = (x,y), then r(z') = r(j). The type assignment r induces a distribution of
types which may have finite or continuous support; we shall be concerned with
both cases depending on context.
This somewhat unconventional construction is appropriate for two reasons.
First, the core is the equilibrium concept that we will use, and this is defined in
terms of individuals rather than types. Moreover, in the environments we shall be
considering, defining an equilibrium directly in terms of types is awkward because
we cannot guarantee that all agents of a given type get the same payoff (i.e.
there is no "equal treatment property"). Secondly, we use the two-dimensional
set of agents because we require that there is a continuum of agents of every type
so that the segregation-payoff reasoning is logically consistent. Throughout the
discussion, however, we shall talk interchangeably in terms of either individuals
or types matching together, blocking allocations, etc. as convenience and clarity
dictate.
We will follow much of the literature in restricting attention to matches of size
two (some of our results generalize to multiperson matches, as we will indicate);
the next step then is to specify what the payoff possibilities are for a pair of
individuals. The most general approach would be to simply posit that there is
such a set with abstract properties. For definiteness, we shall specify a somewhat
restricted class for the reader to keep in mind; our examples will all come from
this class.
In many applications, the individuals are assumed to be risk-neutral income
maximizers who can feasibly share the output of their joint production in any
way. The level of output they can generate depends on their type according to a
(possibly stochastic) "production function" h(t, t, 6), where ^ 6 i ' are parameters
reflecting aspects of the technology: we shall often be interested in studying how
the pattern of matching varies with changes in this parameter. Thus the set
of utilities that a pair of individuals with types t and t can generate would be
described as
V(t,£) = {(vi,u2) e R2|vi + v2 < h(tX0)}-
The notation reflects the fact that the utility possibilities of the pair of agents
do not depend on what other agents in the economy are doing: there are no
externalities across coalitions.2' We shall maintain this assumption throughout.
Since we are interested in studying how market imperfections affect matching
outcomes, we shall need a more general framework. This is easily accommodated
by considering utility possibility sets of the form
^ ' i : f 2 X ; M ; M ) M(o,o)}.
(2.1)
We have added some extra variables: q £ Q C M.m represents possible techno-
logical or organizational choice variables for the coalition (supposed contractible
and/or publicly observable), x E X C Rn are unobservable or noncontractible
choices that can be made by the individual partners, and (p £ Rp are parameters
3Of course the equilibrium payoffs in one coalition will depend on the other coalitions, in
general. The restriction on externalities may exclude certain types of imperfections from the
analysis (e.g. community formation models such as [3] and [9] in which there are congestion
effects), but we believe our approach has some relevance to those cases.
representing costs associated with asymmetries of information within the coalition
or between the coalition and the outside world.
The function g has been subtracted from the original production function
to account for costs to the coalition arising from certain market imperfections.
For instance, g could represent the cost of monitoring the partners' effort. Or it
could be a general representation of the cost of financial market imperfections: for
example, one element of 9 could be a fixed capital requirement k without which
no output can be produced, the types could be wealth levels, and 0 > 1. Then
one way to write a capital market imperfection would be
g(q, t, t, h, (f)) = max{A; — t — i, (f){k — t — i)}.A
Finally, the constraint (s) / are restrictions on how the output is shared and
are typically present when there are incentive problems (of the hidden action or
hidden information variety) within the coalition. (Note there are possibly as many
constraints as there are choices in X, although usually only a few of these bind).
The minimum payoff to one partner may depend on his and his partner's types,
the observable choices q, the unobservable choices x that he might make, and the
technology and information parameters 9 and (p. For example, if effort e is zero
or one and not directly observable, q 6 [0,1] a monitoring intensity measuring
the probability of detecting a shirking partner, and a partner of type t incurs a
disutility t if and only if he exerts effort, an incentive compatibility constraint
might assume the form Vi > e(- — t).
All choice sets are compact and h, g, and / are continuous in the choice
variables; h and / are continuous and g lower semicontinuous (so that h — g is
upper semicontinuous) in types. These assumptions help to ensure existence of
an equilibrium.
We assume that the payoff to an unmatched individual is zero and that a
coalition of larger than two individuals cannot achieve anything that could not
also be achieved by subcoalitions of size one or two. Notice that (0, 0) E V(t, i) for
any pair of types. What we have done then is to specify a game in characteristic
function form, and by a slight abuse of the conventional definition, we will often
refer to V(«, •) as the characteristic function.
Of course, the characteristic function can be generated in other ways from
the one we have described here. For instance, the / functions could be used to
describe the utility possibility set for a situation (with or without imperfections)
in which the partners are risk averse. As should be clear, Propositions 2, 6, and
9 apply to the more general case, and in fact, we will examine an instance of this
9
in Section 2.4.4.
Consider two individuals of the same type t who are matched together. Define
the segregation payoff of type t as the (unique) payoff u (t) such that (u (t) ,u(t))
is on the Pareto frontier of the convex hull of V (t,t). (Sometimes V(t,t) itself
fails to be convex, in which case its Pareto frontier may not intersect the 45° line;
this is why we use the convex hull.8) See Figure 2.1. The segregation payoff has
the interpretation of the minimum utility that an agent can expect to get: if two
agents of a particular type get less than this, they can always match together and
share the output equally (at least in expectation).
Figure 2.1: about here
In partial equilibrium analyses (bargaining problems, principal-agent models),
outside options are exogenously given and are crucial for predicting how gains from
cooperation will be allocated across the individuals. In our framework however,
the outside option of an individual will usually be his equilibrium payoff. There is
therefore no obvious operational concept of outside option that can be used if one
wants to understand the structure of equilibria without having to compute them.
What we hope to show in this paper is that the segregation payoff is actually
such an operational concept: it tells us a lot about the patterns of matching that
can arise in equilibrium, and from this information computation of equilibrium is
greatly simplified.
It will often be convenient to analyze economies using a modified characteristic
function that captures the notion of the potential gains from "trade" (i.e., hetero-
geneous matching). Formally, let S (t,i) = {(0,0)}u(|V (t,t) - (u(t),u(t))] HR2+)
and let S (t) = {0}.9 Denote by Sp its Pareto frontier.
Special notation is useful for the case in which utility is transferable within
coalitions (in terms of (2.1), this is the case / = 0). This case encompasses many
of the perfect-markets examples already present in the literature. It also includes
a number of imperfect markets examples (the imperfect financial market example
below is one). If surplus is transferable, there exists a such that the Pareto frontier
8
 Actually, it is enough to consider the intersection of the 45° line with the Pareto frontier of
the comprehensive extension V — R+ of V in order to ensure that the segregation payoff is well
defined.
9Therefore, if the segregation payoff vector lies "above" the feasible set, we define the surplus
set to be the zero vector. The fact that the surplus is zero captures the idea that there are no
gains from trade.
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can be expressed as Sp = i s 6 IR.+ : Si + «2 = <^ } • Since <J depends on the types,
we have a surplus function which is the maximum of 0 and a and which we
write a(t,i).10 Observe that a(t,t) = 0 for all t.
2.2. Equilibrium
The equilibrium specifies the way individuals are matched to each other, i.e., the
way the set / is partitioned into coalitions. We use the core as the equilibrium
concept: a partition can be part of an equilibrium if there exists a payoff structure
that is feasible for that partition and such that it is not possible for any individuals
to obtain a higher payoff by forming a coalition different from their equilibrium
coalition.
Denote by P the set of measure consistent partitions of / into subsets of size
two at most.11
Definition 1. An equilibrium is a pair (V, u) consisting of a partition V € P and
a utility allocation u : / —• TSSL such that
(i) u is feasible: for almost all P = {i,j} G V, (u(i):u(j)) 6 V(r(i),T(j)).
(ii) u cannot be blocked or improved upon: there does not exist a pair of agents
{i,j} and a vector of payoffs (u(i),u(j)) E V(r(i):r(j)) such that (u(i),u(j)) >>
Our assumptions guarantee that an equilibrium always exists if / = 0 or if the
type distribution has finite support (see the Appendix and Gretsky-Ostroy-Zame
[11], Kaneko-Wooders [12] and Wooders [28]).
We first note that all equilibria are constrained Pareto efficient. Indeed, since
effective coalitions are finite, the grand coalition cannot achieve anything more
than what two person coalitions can achieve. If there were a Pareto improvement,
then the grand coalition could block the equilibrium payoff but then a two person
coalition could also do it and this would violate the definition of an equilibrium.
L0Thus, a(t,t') = max. {O,H{t,t')-±[H{t,t) + H {?,?)]}, where #(-,-) is the maximized
value of net output h(q, x;-,-,0) — g(q,x;-,-,9,(f)); ^H (i,t) is just the segregation payoff for t.
11
 Let P b e a partition of / . Let V2 be the set of elements of V of size two. List the elements
of every P G V2 according to the lexicographic order >ZLon M2 (hence, write P = (i, j) when
i ^1L j)- Let I1 be the set of agents who are first and I2 the set of agents who are second. V
is measure consistent if A (71) = A (/2) . This restriction rules out partitions in which say, all
agents in [0,1/3] x [0,1] are matched one-to-one with all the agents in (1/3,1] x [0,1]. See also
Wooders [28] and Kaneko-Wooders [12].
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In the case of transferable utility (that is the case in which the function /
in (2.1) is identically zero),12 something much stronger can be asserted, namely
that the equilibrium match will maximize the aggregate net output (this includes
in particular the case in which g is nonzero). In this case, any pair of matched
agents who are part of an equilibrium will always maximize their joint net output
h — g. Call this maximized value H(a, b) when an a matches with a b (it always
exists under our assumptions). Observe that if a and b are two types which are
unmatched in equilibrium, then u(a) + u(b) > H(a,b), else the pair (a, b) would
block.13 Now, if the equilibrium matching pattern (a,ra(a)) fails to maximize
aggregate net output (ra(a) is the (set of) type(s) that are assigned to type a),
there is another measure consistent match (a,rh(a)) which generates a higher
aggregate; for at least some type a such that m(a) ^ m(a) we must then have
u(a) +u(fh(a)) < i7(a,ra(d)), or the aggregate could not be higher. But then the
pair (a,rh(a)) would have blocked the original equilibrium. A similar argument
can be made for the aggregate surplus,14 and we have
Proposition 1. If f = 0, then in equilibrium (i) the match is efficient in the
sense that given the type distribution, it maximizes aggregate net output; and (ii)
aggregate surplus is also maximized.
The optimality of equilibrium (i) under transferable utility is, of course, well
known; what we want to emphasize here is that certain market imperfections
can still be treated under the rubric of transferable utility and therefore lead to
efficient outcomes. We will return to this point in Section 3.2.1. As we will also
show there, result (ii) can be useful in computations.
12
 The terminology may be slightly confusing because we have assumed that agents are risk-
neutral in income. However, incentive or liquidity constraints restrict how utility can be trans-
ferred from one agent to another, so it is important to bear in mind that transferability is a
separate assumption.
13
 With transferable utility, there must be equal treatment, so there is no ambiguity in denoting
the equilibrium utility u as dependent on type rather than on individual.
14In this case, note that in equilibrium, u(a) > u(a). If m(a) is a match which yields higher
surplus, we have J <j(a,m(a)) = J u(a) + u(m(a)) — u(a) — u(m(a)) = f u(a) + u(m{a)) —
u(a) — u(ih(a)) < j o{a,rh{a)). So there is a type a for which <r(d,m(a)) > u(a) +u(m{a)) —
u(d) — u(rh(a)) > 0; Thus i/(a,m(d)) — u{a) — w(ra(d)) > u{a)-\-u{m(aj) — u(a) —u(rh(a)), or
H(a,fh(a)) > u(a) +w(m(d)),which again contradicts no-blocking.
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2.3. Descriptions of Equilibrium
Since we are unconcerned with the identities of individuals in this economy apart
from their type, we shall usually denote a coalition by the types of its members,
i.e. a coalition consisting of individuals i and j will be written as (a, 6), where
r(i) = a and r(j) = b. We now provide some definitions useful for characterizing
equilibria.
The simplest (and strongest) form of monotone matching occurs when each
agent matches only with someone like himself, a condition we refer to as segrega-
tion.
Definition 2. An equilibrium (V,u) satisfies segregation (SEG) if for almost all
P eV, t = i £or(t,t) E P.
Definition 3. An equilibrium (V, u) satisfies essential segregation (ESEG) if there
exists another equilibrium f V, u ) satisfying SEG such that u — u almost every-
where. An economy is segregated if all equilibria are essentially segregated.
Note that if an economy is segregated, the equilibrium payoff is essentially
unique: in equilibrium, almost every individual obtains the segregation payoff for
his type. For this reason, the segregation payoff provides a lower bound on the
outside option of an individual in any equilibrium match.
Segregation is an extreme kind of equilibrium outcome. When the set of types
is one-dimensional, the literature has used a weaker concept than segregation,
namely positive assortative matching. For the remainder of this paper then, we
assume that the type space T is one dimensional, that is, a compact subset of the
real line. Strictly speaking, this leaves out the two-sided matching models, but
as we shall see these can be handled within the one-dimensional framework. We
define positive assortative matching as follows.
Definition 4. An equilibrium {V, u) satisfies positive assortative matching (PAM)
if for almost any two equilibrium coalitions P — (a, b) and P' = (c, d) the following
is true:
,d) => min(a,6) > mm(c,d)
Note that segregation is a kind of positive assortative matching.
A third type of matching is "negative assortative," defined analogously:
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Definition 5. An equilibrium (V, u) satisfies negative assortative matching (NAM)
if for almost any two equilibrium coalitions P = (a, b) and P' = (c, d) the following
is true:
,6) > max(c, d) =4> min(a, b) < min(c, d)
These two concepts are illustrated in Figure 2.2. One can define essential
positive assortative matching (EPAM), a positively matched economy, essential
negatively assortative matching (ENAM), and a negatively matched economy in
ways analogous to those done for segregation.
Figure 2.2: about here
There is an equivalent characterization of positive assortative matching which
is useful in some applications. Suppose that we describe any matched pair of types
by listing the larger type first; hence when we write (a, b) we mean that a > b and
that a type a and a type b are matched. We can write m(a) to indicate the type(s)
with which a is matched. There is positive assortative matching in equilibrium
if and only if the graph (a,ra(a)) is upward sloping, as in Figure 2.3.Note that
Figure 2.3: about here
this graph lies weakly below the 45° line and that segregation occurs when the
graph coincides with that line. Negative assortative matching corresponds to a
downward-sloping graph.
While the terminology we use is standard, there seems not to be a consensus in
the literature on what is meant, for instance, by "positive assortative matching."
For example, Shimer and Smith [26] define it by requiring that the graph (a, m(a))
(note that the pairs are not necessarily ordered by size) form a lattice. This is a
useful definition for the problem they are studying, namely matching under search
frictions, but it is too weak to be of interest in the frictionless case. Moreover,
the class of models they consider leads to segregation in the absence of search
frictions, not PAM.
2.4. Distribution-Free Conditions for Monotone Matching
The Becker result suggests that it is possible to find conditions on the characteris-
tic function such that we need know nothing about the type distribution in order
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to conclude that the economy satisfies PAM. Sometimes PAM is all one wants to
know; in other instances (we shall study some below), knowing that PAM will be
satisfied greatly facilitates computation of the equilibrium. Thus, our first goal
is to provide characterization results for segregated and positively and negatively
matched economies which can be checked without considering the particular type
distribution. They are expressed in terms of conditions which depend only on
the characteristic function and are therefore relatively easy to verify. Later, we
shall examine some consequences of the failure of our necessary and sufficient
conditions
2.4.1. Segregation
Our first condition is based on the observation that if we are always to have seg-
regation, the segregation payoff vector must not lie "inside" the utility possibility
set of any heterogeneous coalition.
Definition 6 (Condition S). Let
X = {(t,i) e T2 : 3v e V (t,i) , v > (u(t) ,u(i))}.
Condition S is satisfied if X is empty.
X is the set of types for which there are gains from "trade," i.e. heterogeneous
matching, meaning that it is possible for individuals of those types to match and
Pareto improve relative to the segregation payoffs. Some examples are illustrated
in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: about here
An example of a model in which Condition S is satisfied is the one in [14],
since h{a,b) — ab, u{a) = ^- and for any a ^ 6, h(a,b) < y + y . Therefore
X = 0. Of course, that economy is segregated. In fact, we obtain the following
general result.
Proposition 2. (i) An economy is segregated if Condition S is satisfied, (ii) If
Condition S is not satisfied, there is a type assignment r such that the economy
is not segregated.
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Proof, (i) Suppose that Condition S holds and that there is an equilibrium which
violates ESEG. This means that a positive measure of agents are receiving more
than their segregation payoffs. For this to be true, there must be heterogeneous
matches (t,t). In such matches, at least one of the agents is getting more than its
segregation payoff; for stability, the other type must be getting at least its segre-
gation payoff. But then there must exist v £ V(t,i) such that v > (u(t) ,u(t)),
which contradicts Condition S.
(ii) Suppose that Condition S does not hold: there exists a pair of types (£, t)
and a v G V(t,t) such that v > (u(t) ,u(i)); clearly this is only possible iit^t.
Take the type assignment which puts an atom of size 1/2 at t and an atom of size
1/2 at t. There is an equilibrium in which almost every coalition is composed of
types (t,i) and the payoffs are given by v (or by v € V(t,i) in case v is Pareto
dominated by v). These payoffs cannot be replicated by segregation, hence the
economy is not segregated. •
The result says simply heterogeneous coalitions may form only if there are
"gains from trade" relative to the segregation payoffs; otherwise there can only
be segregation. The same result is true for general matching problems as long
as effective coalitions are finite: one merely has to modify Condition S to say
that there is no finite set of heterogeneous types which can strictly Pareto im-
prove relative to the corresponding segregation payoff vector. Moreover, neither
the definition of segregation nor the result depend on the dimension of the type
space.15
Note that if we want all equilibria in an economy to satisfy SEG, we need the
segregation payoff vector of any heterogeneous coalition to be outside its feasible
set, i.e., that (u{t) ,u(P)^ 6 V(t,£) implies t = i. Hence, Condition S can be
restated to say that the set { {t,t) '• S (t, £) = {(0, 0)}} has full measure. For the
transferable utility case, Condition S can be written a(-, •) = 0.
There are, of course, conditions on the primitives of the model which lead to
Condition S. For instance, suppose that we are in the standard perfect-markets
setting without choice variables. If types are "truly" one-dimensional (so that
agents aren't described by a "gender" in addition to their ability, as in Becker),
it is natural to suppose that the production function is symmetric in type.16 The
15
 Condition S is also a sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium for any distri-
bution of types, even without continuity assumptions on V(-,-): any allocation in which each
coalition consists of two individuals of the same type is clearly measure consistent and cannot
be blocked.
16In fact, many "asymmetric" production functions can be made symmetric by specifying the
type space appropriately. For instance, in the hospital-intern matching problem [21], we might
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following sufficiency result is known; we state it here for completeness.
Proposition 3. Suppose that utility is transferable, the production function as-
sumes the form h(a, b), and it is symmetric in types: h(a, b) — h(b, a). If h is also
supermodular, the economy is segregated.
Proof. If h is supermodular, it satisfies the inequality h(x V y) + h(x A y) >
h(x) + h(y)]17 putting x = (a, b) and y = (b, a) and using symmetry then implies
that h(a,b) — |[/i(a,a) + /i(6, b)] < 0; hence a(a,b) = 0 and the economy is
segregated. •
This result suggests that innocuous-looking restrictions on production func-
tions may turn out to be undesirably strong. In this case, if one is to have
(nontrivial) heterogeneous matching, one must rule out supermodular production
functions, or else introduce imperfections.18
2.4.2. Positive Assortative Matching
The logic of our necessary and sufficient condition for positive assortative matching
is similar to that for segregation: if we do not have PAM everywhere, there
must be a negative pair of matches somewhere. For now, assume that utility
is transferable, and consider four types a > b > c > d and a negative match
of the form (a, d) and (6, c) (there are other combinations to consider, but we
simplify the argument by ignoring them for now; details are in the Appendix),
which generates a total surplus of a(a^ d) + a(b, c). To ensure EPAM, this negative
match must be generating the same payoffs that would be generated under PAM,
or the negative match could be blocked by a rearrangement of the types. Since
the surplus is transferable, it is necessary that the total surplus generated under
the positive matches of these types be at least equal to that of the negative match.
have joint output equal to /i(a, b) = a2b, where a is the hospital's productivity and b is the
intern's ability. If one thinks of a hospital of type r\ = (a, 0) and an intern of type t = (0,6),
where the first component is hospital productivity and the second component is intern ability,
then the type space is now ([a, a] x {0}) U({0} x [b, b]). Output can now be written as a symmetric
function of rj and i, namely h(rj, L) = max{/i(//j, t2), h(Li,rj2)}-
17For rr, y £ M? we denote by x A y the componentwise minimum of x and y : x A y =
(min{xi,2/i},min{a;2,2/2}); similarly, xVy = (max{x1,y1} , max {£2,2/2}) •
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 This conclusion does not change greatly if we introduce choice variables into the production
function. For instance, if h(q; a, b) is symmetric and supermodular in types and C2, q is a real-
valued choice, and ft.12 is single-signed (by symmetry h^ will be as well), then H(a,b) =max
h(q; a, b) will be symmetric and supermodular and we get segregation.
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In other words, either a(a,b) + a(c,d) > a(a,d) + <r(6,c) or <r(a, c) + cr(6,d) >
a(a1d) + <J(6,C). A rearrangement of these inequalities suggests the following
Definit ion 7. The symmetric function F : R2 —>• ]R satisfies weak increasing
differences (WID) on a set T C M if for any four elements a,b,c,d of T, where
a > b> c > d,
F (b, c)-F (b, d) < F (a, c) - F (a, d)
or
F (b, c)-F ( c , d)<F ( a , 6) - F ( a , d ) .
Definition 8 (Condition PT) . The surplus a satisfies Condition PT if it sat-
isfies WID on T whenever <j(a,d) > 0.
Condition PT is the necessary and sufficient condition we seek:
Proposition 4. When the surplus is transferable: (i) An economy is positively
matched if Condition PT is satisfied, (ii) If Condition PT is not satisfied, there
is a type assignment T such that the economy is not positively matched.
Proof. Appendix.
The weak increasing difference condition resembles the familiar increasing dif-
ference (ID) condition discussed for instance in [20]: F satisfies ID if for all a > b
and c > d, F (a,c) — F (a, d) > F (6, c) — F (b7 d). WID is weaker since it re-
quires comparison among four ordered elements (while the ID condition would
not require that a > c).19
As is well known, increasing differences is equivalent for smooth functions to
non-negative cross partial derivatives. Typically, however, a will not be differ-
entiable everywhere, even if it is derived from a smooth production function. In
fact, a will be smooth and satisfy PT only if it is identically zero, and hence sat-
isfies Condition S. It can also be shown that any smooth function which satisfies
WID also satisfies ID. But many production functions that are useful in matching
applications (such as those used by Kremer-Maskin) are not smooth, and do not
satisfy ID, although they do satisfy WID.
Often it is easier to check that the production function satisfies WID than that
a satisfies PT. Fortunately, we have
19
 Another way to see this is to note that ID implies that
F (a, c)-F (a, d) > F (b, c) - F (b, d) and F (a, b) - F (a, d) > F (c, b) - F (c, d)
whenever a > b> c > d.
18
Proposition 5. If h satisfies WID, then a satisfies PT and the economy is posi-
tively matched.
Proof. Since Condition PT is necessary and sufficient for the economy to be
positively matched, it is enough to show that h implies the economy is positively
matched. Suppose not, i.e. that for some distribution of types there is an a > b >
c > d with matches (a, d) and (6, c) which are not payoff equivalent to a positive
match. But since h(a,d) + h(b,c) < /i(a,c) + h(b,d) or h(a,d) + h(b,c) <
h (a, b) + h (c, d), at least one of the pairs of matches (a, c) and (6, d) or (a, b) and
(c,d) generates at least as high total output. Thus either the negative match is
payoff equivalent to a positive one or one of the pairs (a, c), (6, d), (a, 6), or (c, d)
can block it, a contradiction. •
Notice that the converse is not true, since h could fail to satisfy WID at a
point at which a does not or at which a is zero; an instance of this is given in the
next example.
On the other hand, in some instances, the surplus function will be more in-
formative than the production function about the properties of the equilibrium
match. For instance, there are cases in which production functions are neither
super- nor submodular and yet from the surplus computation it is easy to see that
the economy must be segregated:
Example 1. Let T = [4,5] and h(a,b) — A(y/a + Vb) — emax{a35,63a}, where
0 < e < ^ ^ . It is. straightforward to verify that ha and hb are positive wher-
ever they exist (which is everywhere except on the diagonal). And hab < 0 al-
most everywhere; hence h is not supermodular and doesn't satisfy WID. Nor is
it submodular, since this would require /i(a, b) + h(b,a) > /i(a, a) + h(b,b); but
h(a,b) + h(b,a) - [h(a:a) + h(b,b)] a a4 + bA - 2max{a36, 63a} < 0 on T2. By
the same token, a(a, b) = max{0, h(a7 b) — \{h(a, a) + /i(6, b)]} = 0 there, and the
economy is segregated.
We have a condition analogous to PT for the case in which surplus is not
transferable. Let SD = S\SP denote the set of Pareto dominated elements of S.
Definition 9 (Condition P) . Condition P is satisfied if for any four elements
{a,b,c,d} ofT, where a > b> c> d , (s(a),s(d),s(b),s(c)) e Sp (a,d)x Sp (b,c),
and S (a:d) ^ {(0, 0)} one of the two conditions below is true. Either




3t e {a,d} , i E {b,c} such that (s(£),s(i)) e SD (t,i) (2.3)
As with Condition PT, Condition P says that for any negative match, either
it is possible to reassign the types in a positive way that keeps all four types (at
least) indifferent (2.2), or the match is not stable (2.3).
Proposition 6. (i) An economy is positively matched if Condition P is satisfied,
(ii) If Condition P is not satisfied, there is a type assignment r such that the
economy is not positively matched.
Proof, (i) Suppose that Condition P holds. If an economy is not positively
matched, there exist a, 6, c, d where a > b > c > d and payoffs (s(a), s(d), s(b), s(c)) E
Sp (a, d) x Sp (b, c) ,20 such that the matches (a, d) and (b, c) are part of the equi-
librium and it is not possible to obtain a positively matched reshuffling of these
types which keeps the payoffs the same (2.2 is violated). Since there are no benefi-
cial deviations from the equilibrium payoffs s, (2.3) is also violated, contradicting
Condition P.
(ii) Suppose that Condition P is not satisfied. Since (2.2) is violated, (s(a), s(b), s(c), s(d))
£ S(a,b) x 5(c,d) and (s(a),s(c),s(&),s(d)) g S(a,c) x 5(6,d). Since (2.3) is
violated, for each t G {a, d) and each t € {6, c} , (s(£),s(f)) ^ 5*° [i,t) . Conse-
quently, it is not possible to replicate the payoffs s by a positive match between
a, b, c and d. Consider r such that there are four atoms at a, 6, c and d of equal
mass. The matches (a,d) , (b,c) together with the payoff s constitute an equilib-
rium and the economy is not positively matched. •
Propositions 2, 4, and 6 show that if the characteristic function satisfies certain
properties, the equilibrium matching pattern will (essentially) always assume a
positive assortative form. But in economies in which this condition is violated,
the outcome will be sensitive to type assignment map: the equilibrium matching
pattern will depend on the distribution of types. We will illustrate this point in
the Applications section below.
2.4.3. Negative Assortative Matching
Since the logic is similar, we state here without proof conditions for negative
matching which are analogous to Conditions P and PT.
20If (s(a), s(d), s(b), s(c)) £ Sp (a,d) x Sp(b,c), either (a, d) or (b, c) has an incentive to
deviate from the proposed payoffs.
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Definition 10. The symmetric function F : R2 —»• R satisfies weak decreasing
differences (WDD) if for any four elements a,b,c,d ofT} where a > b > c > d,
F(b,c)-F(b,d) > F(a,c)-F(a,d)
and
F (b, c)-F (c, d) > F (a, b)-F (a, d).
Note that this condition is still weaker than decreasing differences (and indeed
is implied by it), since it applies only to quadruples of types with the specified
order.
Definition 11 (Condition NT). The surplus a satisfies Condition NT if it sat-
isfies WDD on T whenever a(a,d) > 0.
Proposition 7. When the surplus is transferable: (i) An economy is negatively
matched if Condition NT is satisfied, (ii) If Condition NT is not satisfied, there
is a type assignment r such that the economy is not negatively matched.
Proposition 8. If utility is transferable, and the production function is symmet-
ric and strictly submodular on R2, the economy is negatively matched.
There is no direct analog to Proposition 5 because strict WDD by itself is not
enough to rule out segregation, which after all is a kind of positive assortative
matching. However, if it is known on other grounds that matching will be het-
erogeneous, it is sufficient for ENAM only that the production function satisfy
WDD.
Definition 12. Condition N is satisfied if for any four elements a > b > c > d,
the following conditions both hold:
(i) if(s(a):s(b),s(c),s(d)) e Sp(a,b) x Sp(c,d), then
either (s(a), s(d), s(b),s(c)) e SD (a,d) x SD(b,c)
or3te {a, b}, 3t E {c,d} , {s(t),s(t)) E SD (t,i)
(ii) if(s(a),s(c),s(b)Js(d)) E Sp(a,c) x Sp(b,d), then
either (s(a),s(d),s(b),s(c)) E SD (a,d) x SD(b,c)
or3tE {a,c}, 3t E {b,d} , (s(t),s(i)) E SD
Proposition 9. (i) An economy is negatively matched if Condition N is satisfied,
(ii) If Condition N is not satisfied, there is a type assignment r such that the
economy is not negatively matched.
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2.4.4. Some Sufficient Conditions for Monotone Matching with Non-
transferable Utility
When utility is nontransferable but the Pareto frontier of the utility possibility
set is strictly decreasing, there are alternative sufficient conditions for monotone
matching that can be fairly easy to verify. We present these here and then show
how they can be used by applying one of them to a model of risk sharing based
loosely on Kihlstrom-LafTont [13] and Sadoulet [23].
Suppose then that for all pairs of types (t,i), the Pareto frontier of S (t, f) is
strictly decreasing (which it is trivially in case S (£,£) = {(0>0)})- Since S (£,£)
is bounded above, there exist two values (j)t£ (t) and 0tt- (£) corresponding to the
least upper bound of the payoff that type t and i respectively can attain in S (t, f)
(since the frontier is decreasing, these occur when the other type receives 0, i.e.
(0, <j)ti (t)) and {4>ti (t) , 0) are elements of S (t, £) . This environment is of general
interest since it corresponds, for instance, to the formation of households with
risk-averse partners or to general bargaining problems.
We shall require the use of a function defined on all of R which is an extension
of the frontier of S (t, £) . Admissable extensions of the frontier can be represented
by a map:
max
 W*) : W*)'5®) e s (*>*) } if 5 ®
otherwise,
where ipti (•) is any strictly decreasing function from R onto itself which satisfies
iPtt (<t>ti (*)) = 0, iPti (0) = <Ptt (t) > a n d 'tPit ° ^tt(s(t)) = s(*)- T h e extension ip of
the frontier can be chosen for computational convenience. By construction, (3ti (•)
is strictly decreasing on R, and (5ti and (5it are inverses: (5ti o (3it (s(t)) = s(t) for
any s(t).
We now provide a sufficient condition for positive matching:
Definition 13 (Condition P*). There exists an extension (3 such that for any
a > b > c > d with (f)^ (d) > 0 and s(d) E [0, 4>ad (d)] , one of the following holds:
either s(d) > f)da o 0ab o 0bc o Pcd (s(d)) (2.5)
ors(d) > Pda°0ac°0cb°PMW)); (2.6)
and for negative matching:
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Definition 14 (Condition N*). There exists an extension (3 such that for any
a > b > c > d where (j)ad (d) > 0, we have
s(d) < <j>cd (d) = > s{d) < f}da o f3ah o f)bc c f3cd (s(d)) (2.7)
ands(d) < 4>M(d)^ s(d)<f)da o / ^ o ^o/3M(s(d)). (2.8)
Proposition 10. Suppose that the Pareto frontier of any surplus set is strictly
decreasing. Then, (i) if Condition P* holds, the economy is positively matched;
(ii) if Condition N* holds, the economy is negatively matched.
Proof. Appendix. •
The basic logic of the proof is very simple. If we are to have a positively
matched economy, we cannot have a negative match that is not payoff equivalent
to a positive one. Suppose instead that in equilibrium there is such a negative
match ((a,d) and (6, c)) with payoffs s(t) (t = a, b,c,d); if the negative match
is stable, we have s(a) = j3ad(s(d)) a n d s(b) = (3bc (s(c)). Stability also requires
that b (strictly) doesn't want to switch to a, given what a is currently getting:
s(b) > /3ba o /3ad(s(d)). And c doesn't want to switch to d : s(c) > f3cd(s(d)).
Since s(b) = /?bc(5(c)), we have s(b) < (3bc o (3cd (s(d)). Thus, (3ba o /?do(s(d)) <
Pbcof3Cd (s(d)) , a n d ^ u s i n g t h e inverse operators, s(d) < (3dao(3abo(3bco(3cd (s(d)).
Similarly, the requirements that b doesn't want to switch to d, and c doesn't
want to switch to a, imply s(d) < f3da o (3ac o /3cb o f3bd (s(d)). The negation of
these necessary conditions for the existence of a stable negative match then yields
Condition P*.
Conditions P* (2.5) and N* (2.8) are illustrated graphically in Figure 2.5 in
which the frontiers are plotted in four-axis diagrams. For instance, positive match-
ing results if paths like that shown starting with s ends up at a point less than
s, i.e., they "spiral in" in either the /3da o (3ab o (3bc o f3cd or (3da o f3ac o fich o (5bd
case; negative matching results if all paths spiral out in both. We expect that
even when closed-form expressions for the frontiers are not available, Conditions
P* and N* can feasibly be checked using numerical methods.
Figure 2.5: about here
It is important to bear in mind that Conditions P* and N* are not necessary
for monotone matching in the general, nontransferable utility case. In the case of
transferable utility, however, they are necessary. To see this, notice that in this
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case, fa (t) = fa (t) = a (t, £) . Hence, if we choose ip^ (s(£)) = fa (£) — s(i) in
(2.4), we have (3ti (s{t)) = a (t,t) - s{t). Observe that (3da o j3ab o f3bc o £cd (s) =
cr (a, d) — (<r (a, b) — (a (b, c) — (a (c, d) — s)). Hence, the first line in Condition
P* is equivalent a (a, d) — a (a, b) + a (6, c) — a (c, d) < 0, which is the first line
in Condition PT. Similarly, the second line of Condition P* is equivalent to the
second line in Condition P. It follows that in this case, Condition P* is equivalent
to Condition PT and is therefore necessary and sufficient for EPAM. Similarly,
Condition N* is equivalent to Condition NT.
Note that Conditions P* and N* might hold for some extensions but not for
others. We provide alternative sufficient conditions that do not require the use
of an extended frontier, but they do require the additional assumption that the
feasible sets are monotonic in type.21 Though the sufficient conditions we obtain
are stronger than the previous ones, they can be easier to verify, and as the
example below will show, are often enough to establish monotone matching.
Corollary 1. Suppose that for any t and t, there exists a real Ett- € IR, increasing
in [t:i^j , such that the Pareto frontier ofV (t,i^J can be described by a bijective
function 7 t £ : (-oo, Ett-) -> (-oo, S t£).
(i) If for any t ^ i, S (t, £) ^ {(0,0)} , and for any a > b > c > d we have
v(d) < ^cd=^lbaolad{v{d))>lbcolcd(v{d)) (2.9)
and
v(d) < Sb d^7 c ao7 a d(^(rf))>7 c bo7 M(i ;(d)) , (2.10)
then the economy is negatively matched,
(ii) If for any a > b > c > d we have
Iba ° lad (v(d)) < Jbc ° led
v(d) < Sod =* < or (2.11)
1 lea ° lad (V(d)) < leb ° Ibd Hd)) ,
then the economy is positively matched.
21Monotonicity of the feasible sets does not imply monotonicity of the surplus sets. While
it would be possible to obtain a similar result for the surplus sets, the required monotonicity
condition would be unduly restrictive
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Proof. Appendix. •
We now apply this corollary to a simple example of risk sharing.
Example 2. Production is risky with a finite number of possible outcomes w^
and associated probabilities TTJ. Agents are expected utility maximizers who are
identical except for their attitudes toward risk. The utility of income is ua(x)
(u'a > 0 > u'U, where type a E [a, a] is an index of absolute risk aversion: pa(x) =
— ^  ?! is strictly decreasing in a for all x (below we shall use log(x+a) as the family
of utility functions). The only risk sharing possibilities in this economy lie within
(two-person) production units because observing the outcome of production is
prohibitively costly except to the people directly involved. When parties match,
they sign a contract which specifies how the output will be shared in each state
(level of output).
Optimal risk sharing between a type a and a type b is characterized by the
solution to
max Yti-KiUa{wi - Xi) s.t. S ^ w ^ ) > v(b).
The first-order condition (Borch's rule) is u'a(wi — Xi) = \u'b(xi), where A is the
multiplier on the constraint. If a = b and utility is equal for both partners, then
A = 1, from which Xi = Wi/2. Thus the segregation payoff is achieved by equal
sharing in each state.
Observe that any heterogenous pair can guarantee each member the segrega-
tion payoff, as equal sharing is always feasible. Since this will not constitute the
optimal contract,22 the segregation payoff vector can be (strictly) Pareto domi-
nated by every heterogeneous coalition: S(t, i) ^ {(0, 0)} ift^i (so Condition S
is violated), and in fact matching will always be heterogeneous if there is
more than one type in the economy.
The question is what pattern it will assume. Intuitively, we might expect that
the least risk averse will want to insure the most risk averse in order to extract
a large risk premium; the moderately risk averse will be less willing to undertake
this role because it would entail bearing too much risk, so they will match together
instead. We now verify this intuition for the case of logarithmic utility.
Consider then the special case in which ua(x) = \n(x + a) (a can interpreted
directly as a risk parameter or as an initial wealth level; either way, higher a means
22
 To see this, note that pa(x) < Pf,(x) everywhere implies irQ is strictly increasing in x.
Since ^ //~f'-> j s constant at the optimum, W{ — X{ = X{ for at most one value of Wi.
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lower risk aversion, and the form of the optimal contract is of course independent
of the interpretation). Assume that Wi > 0 for each i.
The optimal contract in this case is
from which
W ^ ^ + + V + S ^ l n ^ + a + b).
Let £a& denote Yii7Tiln(wi -f a + b). It is clear that Saf, is increasing in (a,b) and
that the Pareto frontier j a b is a bijection on (—00, T,ab). Applying the 7 operator
as in Corollary for types a > b > c > d, we obtain
Inequalities (2.9) and (2.10) then become
which are satisfied if and only if the function
F(a, b) = e^b
satisfies WDD. But it is easily verified that in fact d2F/dadb < 0;23 thus WDD is
satisfied (strictly), and we conclude by Corollary 1 (i) that in the risk-sharing
economy with logarithmic utility, agents will always match negatively
in wealth.
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 To see this, note that OF/da = dF/db = ^ M ^ i + a + ft)77*"1 H^^Wj + a +




Distribution-free conditions for monotone matching are relatively easy to verify.
In general, distribution will affect the match to some degree: m{a) is independent
of distribution if and only if Condition S is satisfied. Invariance of m(a) is of course
a very strong requirement; if one wants only that monotonicity be preserved as the
distribution changes, then Condition P (or N) is necessary and sufficient. If one is
using more refined measures of matching patterns (e.g. the degree of segregation),
then since the matching map is unlikely to be invariant to the distribution, these
measures are also unlikely to be invariant to the distribution.
In checking whether Conditions S, P or N apply for a particular character-
istic function, it will often become apparent that changes in the technology and
imperfection parameters 9 and <f> will affect u{-) and V(-) very differently for
different types. For instance, if <j) measures a degree of capital market imperfec-
tion, increases in <fi will typically lower the segregation payoffs of poor agents but
may have no effect on those of wealthy ones; at the same time, the production
possibilities for mixed coalitions, if one partner is wealthy enough, may also be
unaffected. Thus for low (j) we could have segregation, while for high 0 we would
have heterogeneous, even negative, matching: Conditions S will be satisfied at
some parameter values, while for others it will not. The consequence is that the
qualitative properties of the equilibrium matching pattern, even for a fixed type
distribution, will vary across economies.
When the conditions for monotone matching are violated, the distribution will
also play an important role in determining the qualitative nature of the outcome.
In these more difficult cases, though our monotonicity conditions may be violated
globally, they are often satisfied locally, and this information can be useful in
computing the match. We shall demonstrate this point in the Applications section.
2.5. When Is the Match Invariant to Changes in Technology?
The previous subsection has been concerned with finding conditions on the char-
acteristic function such that the "qualitative" property of the match is not depen-
dent on the particular type distribution. That is, given an arbitrary distribution
of types, any change to the characteristic function which preserves Condition P
(N) will preserve positive (negative) assortative matching. But we may be inter-
ested in a stronger question: is there a class of characteristic functions all of which
give rise to the same match? If this is the case, then changes in technology (or
in the severity of imperfections) which preserve this class will leave the matching
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pattern invariant.
In this section we show that the answer to this question is yes, and with it we
can clarify the differences in the comparative statics of the two-sided matching
models such as that of Becker and of one-sided models such Kremer-Maskin's that
we alluded to in the Introduction. We do not provide an exhaustive characteri-
zation of invariant matches, but will focus instead on a particular one that has
appeared repeatedly in the literature, which we call median matching.
We consider the case of transferable utility. Let the support of the type
distribution be contained in [a, a]. The surplus can be written in the form
max{0, h(a, b) — \[h{a, a) + /i(6, b)]}. Fix one of the types (say a) and plot this as
function of the other type. Typically, the picture will resemble Figure 2.6(a) (note
that the surplus is always equal to 0 at a). Suppose, however, that as in Figure
Figure 2.6: about here
2.6(b) the surplus achieves a unique minimum at a and is increasing on (a, a] and
decreasing on [a, a). We say in this case that the surplus is single-troughed for a.
Definition 15. The economy satisfies the single-trough surplus condition (STSC)
if the surplus is single-troughed for all a in the support of the type distribution.
The result, which is surprisingly easy to prove, is that if we have an atomless
type distribution, the STSC holds, and the production function satisfies WID,
then the equilibrium matching pattern has a simple characterization in which the
highest type matches with the median type, and all other match in such a way
as to keep the "probability distance" between a type and his partner constant at
1/2. Because of full transferability and the atomless distribution, the matching
correspondence m(a) is in fact a function.
Proposition 11. Suppose that the STSC holds, that h satisfies weak increasing
differences and that the assignment map r generates a continuous distribution of
types T{a). Then there exists an essentially unique equilibrium matching pattern
in which for a E [am, a], T(a) — T(m(a)) = | , where am is the median type.
We call this matching pattern median matching.
Proof. Denote by s(a) = u(a) — u(a) the amount of surplus that a obtains in
equilibrium. Suppose that m{a) < am. Since h satisfies WID, we have PAM,
which implies that ra(a) < m(a) for m(a) < a < a. But this violates measure
consistency, since more than one-half the population is matching with less than
one-half the population. Thus m{a) > am. A similar argument establishes that
m{a) < am- Suppose that these inequalities are strict. In equilibrium, we must
have a(a,m(a)) — s(m(d)) > <j(a,m(a)) — s(m(a)), else a would try to match
with m(a). Thus s(m(a)) — s(m(a)) > a(d,m(a)) — a(dJm(d)) > 0, the last
inequality following from the STSC. The same argument for a establishes that
s(m(a)) — s(m(a)) < 0, a contradiction. Therefore m(a) = m{a) = am. To
complete the argument for the remaining types, note that if T(a) — T(m(a)) > |
for a > am, then the measure of agents between am and a, who by PAM are
matching with agents between a and ra(a), exceeds that of the latter set, which
violates measure consistency. A similar violation of measure consistency occurs if
T{a)-T(m(a)) < \. •
An example of an economy which conforms to these hypotheses is the one in
Kremer-Maskin, provided the support of the type distribution is tight enough.
We shall return to this below.
Three observations are in order. First note that heavy use is made of the
fact that we have PAM; this illustrates how our distribution-free conditions can
simplify the computation of equilibrium.
Second, if the technology or production changes in such a way as to preserve
WID and the STSC, the match will be unchanged because there is only one way
to have median matching for a given distribution of types.
Third, any change in the type distribution that preserves WID and the STSC
(for instance, small changes in the support of the distribution), preserves median
matching, although this in general means that the types which match will change
after the distribution changes. In particular, we have
Corollary 2. Suppose that h satisfies WID and that the STSC holds on [a, a].
Then there is median matching for any continuous distribution with support in
[a, a].
Of course, if the distribution changes by "stretching" the support enough, then
STSC will not generally hold on all of the new distribution's support, and we will
lose median matching (although because of WID we retain positive assortative
matching). This is the main comparative static result of [15].
The STSC case is not the only one delivering median matching. Write a _L b
when a and b are on opposite sides of the median (i.e. a < am < 5 or a > am >
6). Now consider the following class of transferable utility models, which we call
class M:
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1. Whenever a > 6 J _ c > d , c r satisfies one of the weak-increasing-difference
inequalities a (6, c) — a(b,d) < <r(a,c) — a(a1d) or a (6, c) — o"(c, d) <
a (a, b) — a (a,d) .
2. For all a, <r(a, b) is strictly positive when a J_ 6
3. <r(a, a') = 0 whenever it is not the case that a l a ' .
Examples of surplus functions belonging to class M are illustrated in Figure
2.7.
Figure 2.7: about here
Proposition 12. If the type distribution is atomless and a belongs to class M,
there is median matching.
Proof. Observe that in this economy, a _L m{a) for almost every a; if not, then on
each side of the median a positive measure of agents are matched with each other
and getting zero; this can be blocked by having the agents find partners with whom
they generate a strictly positive surplus on the other side of the median (measure
consistency assures these potential partners exist). Matching is therefore positive
assortative: if not, there is a negative match of the form (a,d) and (fr,c), with
a > b _L c > d. But this will be blocked since the WID inequalities are satisfied.
Now mimic the argument used in the proof of Proposition 11 to conclude that
matching is median. •
One reason for studying this class is that it can be used to understand many
"two-sided" matching models, such as the marriage market model of Becker. Two-
sided matching models have type spaces which are really two dimensional: there
is a "gender" as well as an ability. A positive payoff is generated only when types
from different sides match.
Consider Becker's model. The joint payoff to a couple consisting of a man
of ability a and a women of ability b is h(a,b); h is supermodular (and strictly
increasing, although this is not essential). Joint payoffs are positive if and only if
a man matches with a woman and can be divided in any way. The distribution of
ability within each gender can be arbitrary. Suppose for simplicity that the total
measure of women (supported on [b,b]) equals that of men (supported on [a, a])
and that the distributions are atomless. It is well-known that the outcome of this
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model has the men of ability a matching with the women of ability b; as the men's
ability decreases, so does the ability of their partners, until a matches with b.2A
The segregation payoff in this model is zero for every type, so the surplus
function a is just equal to the production function h. Now map this model into a
one-dimensional model with a new type space [x, x], where type x is given by
x { t ) = t , t € [b,b], x ( t ) = b + t - a , t e [ a , a ] .
That is, the women are the "left half" of the interval and the men become the
right half. The types b and a are then identified and become the median type xm.
Define a new surplus function a(y,y') = a(x~1(y),x~1(y')). It is clear that a is of
class M (corresponding to Figure 2.7(a)), and we therefore have median matching
which is isomorphic to the match in the Becker model.
This construction, along with Proposition 12, shows why Becker's result is so
strong. Changes to the production technology which preserve supermodularity
of h will also preserve the WID condition, so there is no change to the match
from such changes in the technology. The key property of the two-sided matching
model is that same-side matches generate zero output. This implies (1) that the
segregation payoff is identically zero, which makes the surplus coincide with the
production function; and (2) that the surplus for types on opposite sides is positive
because the production function is. Positivity of the production function for types
on opposite sides of the median is of course a reasonably general property, but
positivity of the surplus is not (neither is it generally equal to zero on the same
side of the median), and the latter is crucial to median matching (or its two-sided
counterpart).
If instead one allowed for positive payoffs to same-sex matches, there generally
would not be median matching (it would no longer be automatic for types on the
same side of the median not to match or for the surplus to be positive for types on
opposite sides), and neither would the match be invariant to changes in technology.
Indeed, the model based on Kremer-Maskin which we study in the next section
is neither of class M, nor does it satisfy the STSC for all admissable technologies,
and we show that technological change which preserves the WID property will
generally change the match.
24The monotonicity of /i(-, •) will play a role if the measure of men is not equal to the measure of
women, in which case the lowest ability agents of the gender in excess supply will be unmatched;
the way surplus is shared among the remaining types will be affected by this, but not the
pattern of matching. The construction in the next paragraph is easily modified to allow for this
possibility.
31
Somewhat less formally, if the distribution of abilities changes (keeping the
measure of the two sides the same), we still retain median matching, which in
particular means that for all distributions, the matching map m(a) is monotonic,
with m(a) = 6, m{a) = b. This is admittedly a crude sort of invariance, since in
general m{a) will depend on the distribution for intermediate values of a. But the
latter effect is perhaps not so conspicuous; insofar as two-sided models have tended
to dominate the literature, we may have an explanation as to why the dependence
of matching patterns on distribution has not been noticed until recently.
3. Applications
We now apply the above theory to the analysis of some examples. First, we
consider the examples discussed by Kremer and Kremer-Maskin. The apparatus
we have developed clarifies and generalizes the results they obtain and leads to
some new comparative static results. The next two examples consider economies
with imperfections. In both cases the production technology satisfies increasing
differences so that the first-best version of these economies will display segregation.
The first example considers a financial market imperfection which results in the
violation of Conditions S and PT. We show that the matching configuration will
be sensitive to the distribution of types and that in some instances the effects
of the imperfections swamp the effects of the production technology. The second
example considers production with an incentive problem. There it turns out that
Condition S is still satisfied but that segregated matching may be inefficient.
3.1. A Perfect-Markets Example
In this subsection we will be interested mainly in how the matching pattern de-
pends on a technological parameter 9. We shall make heavy use of the surplus
concept developed in the previous section.
Let the type space be an interval [a:d], a > 0, and h(a,b) = max {a6*b, bda}
(so [14] corresponds to 9 = 1 and [15] to 9 = 2). The idea is that the tasks
are asymmetric, and that the two partners will be assigned to them in an out-
put maximizing fashion. Since these are transferable utility models, we will use
the surplus function cr(a, b) = max {0, max {a9b7 b9a} — ^(a9+1 + b9+1)} to study
these economies.
A quick calculation shows that h satisfies WID for all 9 > 1 (in fact, for all
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9 > 0),25 so that by Proposition 5 the economy will always be positively matched.
A somewhat longer calculation shows that h is supermodular if and only if 9 = 1.
Thus Proposition 3 tells us that the economy is segregated when 9=1.
For 9 > 1, we know from Proposition 2 that there will be heterogeneous
matches for some type assignments. We can glean the qualitative features of the
match without actually computing the equilibrium just by examining the surplus
function a little more closely. The surplus for a fixed type a as a function of a
potential partner's type b < a is graphed in Figure 3.1 for different values of 9.
Figure 3.1: about here
For fixed a, denote by M(a) the set of b where a(a, b) is positive; a will never
match with a type other than itself that lies outside this set. Notice that for
9 = 1 the set is empty (there is perfect segregation), that for 9 near 1, M[a) is
fairly large, and that as 9 approaches oo, the positive part of the surplus begins
to look like a "spike," so that M(a) becomes small again. Thus for very large 9,
the economy will be (nearly) segregated. Meanwhile, for intermediate values of 9,
we expect to have some degree of heterogeneous matching. Indeed, we can always
find an interval over which the surplus satisfies STSC, and assuming the type
distribution is continuous and supported on that interval, there will be median
matching (Proposition 11) which is indeed heterogeneous.
This suggests that for 9 close to one, increases in 9 will decrease segregation
while for larger values of 9 segregation will increase — there will be a kind of
U-shaped relation between the degree of asymmetry of the tasks and the degree
of segregation in the economy. In [15] it is argued that the degree of segregation
within firms has increased since the early 1970's. While the focus there is on
changes in the distribution of skills, an alternative explanation is that technology
has changed in such a way as to trace out the upward sloping part of the U curve
(if 9 started out low enough, the trend would have been decreasing segregation in
the earlier part of the century).
As for changes in distribution, observe that if we hold 9 fixed and instead
change the distribution by "lengthening" the support, the economy can change
from satisfying STSC to violating it. The matching pattern will then change from
the one described in Proposition 11 to one in which some types are more nearly
segregated (see Figure 3.2).
25
 If 9 > 1 and a > b > c > d, the WID condition becomes a9 c — ae d > bec — bd d, which is
clearly satisfied. The 9 < 1 case is similar.
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Figure 3.2: about here
This kind of result is obtained in [15]. Seen in the light of the forgoing discus-
sion, it is not hard to understand that matching patterns depend on the distribu-
tion of types. However, in this example, matching is always positive assortative;
we shall see a more dramatic example of matching's dependence on distribution
in the next subsection.
3.2. Imperfect-Markets Examples
We consider two examples. The first introduces a financing constraint. The most
obvious change is the differential effect of the imperfection on the segregation
payoffs of different types. Put simply, high ability agents get the same segrega-
tion payoff with or without the financing constraint. Low ability agents suffer
a large decrease in the segregation payoff with sufficiently imperfect financing.
The result is possibly a significant change in the matching pattern (as well as in
the aggregate output of the economy). The same kind of effect was present in
the case of the technological changes studied in the previous subsection, although
here the outcome varies more conspicuously with the type distribution: whereas
in the previous example, matching is always positive assortative, here we will get
mixtures of segregation, positive and negative assortative matching, depending on
the distribution.
Such is not the case in the second example, which introduces a moral hazard
problem into the production process. This reduces the segregation payoff for all
types, but again those of the lowest ability are most severely affected. But a
second effect now comes into play, which is not present in either of the other two
examples: increasing information costs also reduce the transfer ability of utility.
The moral hazard problem requires that payoffs exceed a positive lower bound for
each partner. It turns out that this change in the characteristic function offsets the
changes in the segregation payoffs in such a way as to keep the matching pattern
unchanged: Condition S will always be satisfied. But now aggregate performance
will no longer be optimal, even conditional on the information constraints and the
distribution of types: total surplus could be increased by forcing matches to differ
from their equilibrium form. The source of the failure of optimality of equilibrium
is the restricted transferability introduced by the incentive problem, on which we
comment below.
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3.2.1. Production with an Imperfect Financial Market
Consider now a modification of the standard production model in which a fixed
amount k > 0 of capital is required for production to take place; once this
is invested, output depends on the ability of the firm's members according to
h(a,b) — ab. We assume that the lowest ability a exceeds \fk (so it is always
efficient to produce if the capital market is perfect). The cost of a unit of capital
is normalized to one. All individuals have zero wealth, and therefore every part-
nership must access a capital market in order to finance their firm. This market,
however, is imperfect. We model this imperfection starkly: the output of a firm
must exceed (pk, (p > 1, in order for financing to be possible.26 The joint output
for a pair (a, b) can then be written as
TTl 7 . .. { ab — k. if ab > 6kH(a,b,k,(h) = { •<• i ~ ay 0, it ab < (pk
(Thus in terms of (2.1), h(a, 6, k) — ab — k] g(a, 6, k1 <f>) = ab — k, if ab < (pk and
0 otherwise; and / = 0.)
A perfect capital market corresponds to (p = 1. In this case, the economy will
be segregated by ability, since it is the same as the one in [14]. This outcome is
independent of the initial distribution of types.
As (p increases, the market becomes less efficient, excluding more and more
types from producing positive output on their own. The segregation payoff is
if a2 > (pk
M ( a ) =
 \ 0 2 i f a » < #
Divide the type space into two intervals, AQ = [a, yf^k) and A+ = [y/^k,a]. For
all b E AQ the segregation payoff is zero, while for all a £ A+, it is the same as if
there were no market imperfection.
a2-kIf a is just above V0A:, its segregation payoff falls from 9L~ to zero as 4>
increases, while the same increase in (f> has no effect on the segregation payoff of
26This kind of capital market imperfection can be derived by supposing that the partner
in the firm, upon having to repay, may renege on their debt and escape with probability TT a
punishment which brings their income to zero. Lenders will make loans of size k only to those
firms whose output h will exceed k/{\ — TT), since only for these firms is repaying, which yields a
payoff of h — k, more attractive than reneging, which yields irh. Thus, <p = ^~ = 1 corresponds
to TV = 0; with larger values of TT escape becomes more likely, until with TT = 1, the market shuts
down altogether (0 = oo).
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types far above y/4>k. In fact, for large enough values of (j>, a high type may have
an incentive to match not with another high type, but with a low type instead
because the latter's outside opportunities are so low. Although the segregation
payoff vector lies outside of the Pareto frontier of a heterogeneous coalition when
</> = 1, (Condition S is satisfied) it may move inside the frontier when (f> is positive.
See Figure 3.3. Thus Condition S ceases to be satisfied when 0is large enough: by
Figure 3.3: about here
Proposition 2 there will be heterogeneous matching for some type distributions.
Neither is Condition PT satisfied, as the following example shows. Choose
a > a' > b > | a + ^ so that ab > </>k > a'b and a'2 > </>k > b2. Then a (a, b) =
ab — k — | ( a 2 — k) > 0, while a(a',a!) = a (a! ,6) = a(a, a') = 0. Thus for this set
of types we have a(a,b) + a(a',ar) > a(a,af) + a(a',d) with a(a,b) > 0, which
contradicts PT. Proposition 4 then implies that there are type distributions for
which the match is not positive assortative.
Before delving further into this point, we note that despite the financial market
imperfection, utility is still transferable within each coalition (/ = 0 for all 0).
Proposition 1 therefore has two implications for this model. First, the equilibrium
match will maximize aggregate surplus, which will be helpful in computing the
equilibrium below. Second, aggregate output is also maximized at equilibrium,
which may be of more interest from the welfare point of view.
How do we reconcile optimality of the equilibrium here with the well-known re-
sults that say that in the presence of financial market imperfections, equilibrium
need not maximize aggregate output? Pecuniary externalities are one possible
cause of an inefficient outcome, but these are precluded here because of the as-
sumption that there are no externalities across coalitions. Even without external-
ities, policies which redistribute initial wealth may increase output. Proposition
1 says that matching will be efficient given the distribution of types; this means
that there are no policies that involve a mere reassignment of matches away from
the equilibrium ones that can increase output, although mean-preserving changes
to the initial type distribution (plausible if type is interpreted to be wealth, less
so perhaps if type is ability) might raise output. But purely "associational redis-
tribution" ([6]) can play no efficiency-enhancing role here.27
27In [8], a financial market imperfection leads to a possibly inefficient match. But there the
imperfection does not reduce the total output that a student and a school can produce together,
but rather limits the amount of surplus that a student can transfer to a school, and it therefore
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Turning now to the computation of the equilibrium matching pattern, note first
that for any distribution with support contained in A+, there must be segregation
(for two different types a and a' in this interval, aa' < |a 2 + |a'2, so at least one of
them will always be better off segregating). Indeed, regardless of the distribution,
two different types in A+ will never match, so a heterogeneous match consists of
a type a € A+ and a type b E Ao. It may be tempting to think of this one sided
model as effectively a two-sided model in that it satisfies some of the criteria for
being in class M. Unfortunately, our previous results cannot be applied directly
because, as we have seen, neither WID (nor WDD) is satisfied globally.
Heterogeneous matches must satisfy two other conditions: first, the financing
constraint
ab > # (3.1)
must be met, and second there must be a (weak) gain to matching, which entails
ab-k- -(a2-k) > 0. (3.2)
Let ft denote the set of pairs (a,b), with a E A+ and b E AQ which satisfy (3.1)
and (3.2). Denote by M(b) the set {a E A+\(a,b) E ft}.
The set ft is illustrated in Figure 3.4. Also defined there are points 6*, a*,
and a** representing the simultaneous binding of two constraints. We have also
partitioned ft into the sets ft0 — where a < a* — and fti where a > a*. Agents
Figure 3.4: about here
with ability greater than a** will always segregate because they lose too much by
matching with anyone below y/4>k. Agents below b* will also segregate (trivially
— they don't produce anything) in equilibrium because they are either too unpro-
ductive to generate a positive surplus with the agents > a* who can finance the
firm with them, or too unproductive to finance the firm with agents in [s/^k,a*)
with whom they would otherwise have generated a positive surplus.
The first heterogeneous matching pattern we consider is PAM. Note that if
two pairs (a, b) and (a, b), where a > a > b > b, are in ft, then (&, b) is also in
ft. If also (a, b) is in ft, then (a, b) and (a, b) cannot be equilibrium matches. To
see this, it is enough to note that the surplus of these four pairs satisfy the WID
conditions strictly.
does not correspond to the case / = 0; in this sense it is related to the example in the next
section.
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Denote by A^_ and AQ the intersections of the support of the type distribution
with A+ and AQ. Recall that a subset X C M.2 is a lattice if x, y G X implies that
both xVy and xAy are in X. Notice that while Q,\ is a lattice, QQ is not. Thus, 0,
is not a lattice. But there is a restriction on the support of the type distribution
that ensures monotone matching.
Proposition 13. IfAT+ x AQ D fi is a lattice, then the equilibrium satisfies PAM.
The reason is that if A^ x AQ D Q is a lattice, then any two pairs that can
be chosen out of 0 will satisfy the argument given in the previous paragraph,
i.e. negative matching is not stable. Since equilibrium matches outside 0, involve
segregation, matching overall satisfies PAM.
The condition in Proposition 13 basically requires the distribution of types
to be bipolar: there is a "hole" in the support. Clearly, as long as most of the
mass of the distribution is as in the Proposition, "most " matches will be positive
assortative. A special case of the Proposition is when all gains from trade happen
in Qi. In this case, PAM indeed arises.
Corollary 3. Suppose that A^_ C [a*, a]. Then the equilibrium satisfies PAM.
Proof. In this case, the support of the distribution is such that AT+ x AQ D Q is
equal to A^ X AQ D H I . QI is a lattice. Since A^ X AQ is a lattice and since the
intersection of two lattices is a lattice, Proposition 13 applies. •
If the condition for Proposition 13 is not satisfied, rather different patterns
may arise. For instance, we show below that for a certain distribution of types
the equilibrium satisfies NAM, despite the fact that the surplus satisfies WID on
a set of positive measure.
For what follows we shall generally restrict ourselves to distributions that
are log-uniform on an interval [a, a] (that is, log a is uniformly distributed on
[log a, log a] ). To determine which of the types in M{b) will be matched with 6, we
use the fact (Proposition 1) that aggregate surplus is maximized at equilibrium.
Looking at a relaxed version of the surplus maximization program (i.e. one in
which constraints that reflect the measure consistency requirement are ignored),
we see that the surplus for (a, b) (which is just ab— | a 2 — | on fi ) is maximum at
the lowest a in M(b): namely a = ^-. So maximizing surplus pointwise by putting
m(b) = ^- maximizes surplus in the relaxed program. Now observe that imposing
the measure consistency constraint doesn't change anything: under log-uniformity
it is satisfied with this choice of w,(6), so m(b) = ^- is indeed optimal. Thus the
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equilibrium consists of negative matching between [6*,-»/^) and (y/(j)k, a*] and
segregation elsewhere: the "middle types" match negatively and the other types
segregate. This result is generalized to the cases a > b* or a < a* in the following
proposition.
Proposition 14. Suppose that the distribution of types is log-uniform on [a, a].
The unique equilibrium matching pattern is as follows.
(i) Ifa> y/~4>k or ~a < y/4>k, there is segregation.
(ii) If a < y/^k < a, there exists (a unique) be G [a, y/^k) such that the
equilibrium matching is as follows: there is negative matching between [6e, y/^k)
and ( y/(j)ki T- and types outside these intervals segregate.
Proof, (i) is a direct implication of our earlier discussion. For (ii), let b =
max {a, b*} and a = min {a, a*} . lib < ^ , define be = ^ , b > ^ , define be = b.
•
Using Propositions 13 and 14, we illustrate how the distribution of types can
dramatically affect the equilibrium matching pattern. For descriptive purposes,
call the interval [a, \f^k) the "lower class", the interval y/4>h, y- the "middle
class" and the interval f | - , a the "upper class", where be is as in Proposition 14.
Starting from the log-uniform distribution on [a:'a] suppose that, keeping the av-
erage type in the economy constant, we decrease the measure of the middle class,
by moving middle class agents to the other two classes in a mean preserving way.
If the middle class completely disappears, the support of the new distribution is
[a, y/ffi) U (f j ,a j • But ([a, yf$k) X (|^,o~h PI fi is a lattice, so from Proposi-
tion 13 there is PAM in equilibrium. In general, while the middle class still has
positive measure, equilibrium matching will consist of a mixture of PAM, NAM
and segregation.
It is also possible to obtain some results on the effects of changes in the pa-
rameters of the log-uniform distribution on a numerical measure of the matching
patterns, namely the level of segregation (this is similar to the exercise carried
out in [15]). Let fi((f),a,a) be the measure of the interval \be, | - , i.e., the in-
terval of types that match in a negative fashion in Proposition 14. (Under log-
uniformity, fi (4>:a,a) = °io Q11O°^ e •) A simple measure of the degree of segrega-
tion is 1 — ji ((f),a,a), i.e., the measure of segregated agents.
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Proposition 15. (i)For any a < y/(j)k, // ((j), a, a), as a increases, segregation first
decreases for a E f yffk, min < a*, ^ \\ and then increases for a > min < a*, ^ > .
(ii) Consider a family of log-uniform distributions on [aa, ad], where a < b*,
a > a*. Then, in equilibrium, segregation increases as a increases.
Proof. Appendix. •
In the example of Section 3.1, showed that changes in a technological parame-
ter could generate a U-shaped relation between the degree of relative importance
of one of the tasks and the level of segregation. That comparative static exer-
cise looks at changes in the characteristic function rather than changes in the
type distribution. For the present model, a similar exercise consists in examining
the effect of changes in the severity of the financial market imperfection via the
parameter (j).
Proposition 16. Suppose that the distribution of types is log-uniform on [a, a] ,
where ~a > a > v&, and define (f)* — | ( ( o) "^  ^ ) • ^ e i l > iI2 equilibrium, the
index of segregation decreases with (j) when (j) E (1,0*) and increases with 4> when
Proof. Appendix. •
In other words, segregation is also a U-shaped function of the degree of market
imperfection. Thus trends in the degree of segregation which could be explained
by skill biased technical change or an increasingly unequal skill distribution might
also be explained by improvements in the functioning of financial markets.
3.2.2. Production with an Incentive Problem
In contrast to the efficiency of matching in transferable utility environments (even
those with financial market imperfections or other restrictions on transferability
between coalitions and the outside world), inefficiencies may arise in matching
environments when there are restrictions on transferability within coalitions.28
In these instances, reassignment of matches away from their equilibrium values
can raise aggregate output.
28
 The observation that matching can be inefficient has already been made in the literature
(e.g., [2], [9]), but in those cases it depends on spillovers across coalitions.
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Consider the same production function as before, but now suppose that there
is a moral hazard problem: each partner in a match must take some effort in order
for output to be produced. The effort levels are low and high, with cost 1 if the
high effort is chosen and zero otherwise. In order for partners of ability a and b to
produce ab, both must take the high effort; otherwise output is zero. Effort is not
observable unless it is monitored at a cost: if c(0, q) is invested at the time of the
match, the probability of detecting a partner if he takes the low effort is q (this
probability is independent across partners, but the same q must be chosen for
each partner). Thus (f) > 0 will index the severity of the moral hazard problem.
We assume that c(0,g) = 0, and that c(-, •) is increasing in both arguments and
convex in q.
Each partner receives a contract which specifies that he receives a payment y
if he is not caught taking low effort, and 0 if he is.29 Given the level of monitoring
q, incentive compatibility then requires that y — 1 > (1 — q)y, or y > - . The
net output generated by a firm with partners a and b and monitoring q is then
ab — c(0, q)] but even though the partners are assumed to be risk neutral they
cannot transfer this output to each other arbitrarily: each partner must receive
at least - .3 0
For analyzing this problem it is convenient to consider the maximum payoff
that an agent can achieve assuming his partner is incentive compatible, considered
as a function of q. This expression, h — c(</>, q) 1, with (/> > 0, is graphed
for different values of h in Figure 3.5. Also shown is the incentive compatibility
constraint 1: if h = ab, both a and b must get a payoffs at least this high if
they are to be incentive compatible.
Figure 3.5: about here
For 4> = 0, q is optimally set equal to 1. In this case, the first-best alloca-
tion with segregation is achieved in equilibrium (We assume it is efficient for all
29If one takes the assumption of two partners literally, this is not the optimal contract, since
the firm's output would typically serve as a signal of the partner's effort. We have in mind
situations, such as those in large firms, where output information reveals little about individual
effort and other (costly) signals must be employed instead. See [16] for a more general analysis.
30Thus in terms of (2.1), we have X = {0,1} x {0,1}, Q = [0,1], h(q,x,tyi,0,(f)) =
g(q,x,t,i,6,(p) = c(0,g), f(q,x,t,i, 6,4>) = Xi(± - 1).
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partnerships to produce: if abilities lie in the interval [a, a], then a > y/2.)
Things can be rather different, however, if (f) > 0. Let q (/i) be the lower value
of g, when it exists, at which the graph of h — c(0, q) 1 intersects the graph
q
of - — 1. When q(a2) exists (and lies in [0,1]), the segregation payoff of type
—'-1a is y^-^  — 1. Clearly, there exists a unique h° such that the graphs of
h — c((j), q) 1 and - — 1 are tangent. Hence, when a < vhP, q (a2) does not
exist and the agents have a zero segregation payoff.31
The fact that the segregation payoff is zero for some types creates a situation
parallel to the one with the imperfect financial market: high types might want to
match with low ones because the latter have such poor outside opportunities and
they might be "cheaper" than their more productive counterparts. In other words,
we might conjecture that there would be heterogeneous matches in equilibrium.
The first thing to check, then, is whether Condition S is violated. The surprising
result is that, on the contrary, it is always satisfied:
Proposition 17. The economy with moral hazard is segregated for all (j).
Proof. Suppose instead that there is a heterogeneous match (a, 6), with a > b.
Let q be the level of monitoring they choose. Clearly, a has a positive segregation
payoff (if not, then neither does 6, and nothing can be gained if they match), and
q > q(a2). Let ya and yh be the levels of compensation paid to each of the partners.
If b has a positive segregation payoff and q > q(b2), then since for a heterogeneous
match to occur we must have
,
 u ^ a
2 c ( ^ g ( a 2 ) ) b* c(4>q(#))ya + Vb = ab- c(0, q) > +
we immediately conclude, since c(</>, •) is increasing in g, that
a contradiction.
31If c(6,1) is finite, the set of types with zero segregation payoffs may be larger than [a,
This hardly affects the analysis, however; when it does, we shall point this out.
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If instead q < q(b2) or b has a zero segregation payoff (q(b2) does not exist),
then b2 — c (</>, q) — - < -; heterogeneous matching again requires that- < -; het rogeneous matching aga
/ a2 — c(6,q(a2
ab-c(</>,q)-yb> ^ V
and, since yb > -,
adding these two expressions and rearranging yields
a contradiction. We conclude that no heterogeneous matches can occur. •
Figure 3.6 shows the feasible sets for three possible coalitions and the seg-
regation payoff vector for the mixed coalition, which clearly lies outside of (the
comprehensive extension of) its feasible set.
Figure 3.6: about here
Even though the matching configuration is unchanged when incentive problems
are introduced, there is an important difference between the two cases from a
welfare point of view: when (f> is large enough, the equilibrium will not always be
efficient in the sense of maximizing total output net of monitoring and effort costs.
There are two sorts of reasons for this. First of all, since different types choose
different levels of the monitoring technology, the average level of monitoring that
will be used under heterogeneous matches might be lower than that used under
segregation. More important, in equilibrium some types are "left out" of the
economy, and more output could be generated if higher types were forced to
match with them. In both cases, the source of inefficiency of equilibrium is the
failure of full transferability.
To see this, suppose that c (0, q) = <fiq and <fi > 2. A social planner trying
to maximize total output net of monitoring and effort costs will always want the
partners in a match to share output equally, since this minimizes the level of q
they need to use. Thus, the level of q chosen by a partnership of an a and a b is
given by the smaller solution to
ab — 4>q = -
Q Q
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provided it exists — one needs ab > 80; otherwise the partnership generates zero
output since it is not possible for both members to be incentive compatible. (Since
0 > 2, any partnership that is incentive compatible is also efficient in the sense
that the output net of monitoring costs exceeds the disutility of effort). Solving
for q, one finds that the maximized net output for a pair (a, b) is
H(a,b) =
2
It is tempting to think of H as a "reduced-form" production function, but it differs
from the usual notion of production function in that the level of output produced
is dependent on a particular sharing rule (namely equal sharing) that the planner
has imposed.
With this caveat in mind, note that H is symmetric but neither super- nor
submodular; indeed a simple computation shows that its cross partial deriva-
tive is negative in the range y/8(f) < ab < \/4(y/S + 1)0 and positive for ab >
+ 1)0. As in the case of the financial market imperfection, incentive prob-
lems can cause the properties of the joint output to differ dramatically from those
of the production technology.
Given this fact, it is clear that segregation is not the optimal matching pat-
tern. In fact, if the support of the distribution lies in [(80)1//4, (4(V5 + 1)0)1//4], it
is straightforward to show that the optimum consists of strictly negative match-
ing.32 Thus, even if all types in the economy are able to produce, the segregated
outcome is not generally optimal simply because lower types, when segregated,
(must) choose excessively high levels of monitoring. Aggregate performance is
enhanced when high types match with them: the sacrifice in output is more than
compensated by the reduction in monitoring costs.
A more significant increase in welfare can sometimes be obtained by forcing
types with positive segregation payoffs to match with those with zero. In this case,
32
 To see this, note that if the joint output function is symmetric and strictly submodular, it
satisfies the WDD inequalities: we have
H(x)+H(y) > H(xVy)+H(xAy) by submodularity; putting x = (a, d) and y = (6, c) yields
H(a,d) + H(b,c) > H(a,c) + H(b,d); putting instead y = (c,b) and using H(c,b) = H(b,c)
yields H(a, d) + H(b, c) > H(a, b) + H(c, d). Thus whenever there are four types a > b > c > d,
output is higher when they are negatively matched than when they are positively matched.
Finally, putting x = (a, b) and y = (b,a) establishes that H(a:b) > |[i/(a, a) + H(b,b)] (and
H(c,d) > \[H(c,c) + H(d,d)]), so H(a,d) + H(b,c) > \[H{a,a) + H(b,b) + H(c,c) + H(d,d)],
which shows that segegation is also dominated. The same sort of logic establishes Proposition
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even though the high types will now be in firms that are producing less output
and incurring higher monitoring costs than they do under segregation, there are
more active firms; the employment of previously unused resources can increase
aggregate output very significantly.33 Notice that this effect would remain if q
were exogenously fixed independently of type, while the previous effect would
disappear.
This example illustrates that the efficient (output maximizing) match need
not occur in equilibrium when there is limited transferability due to incentive
problems. We do not have a complete characterization of those nontransferable
cases in which equilibrium fails to be optimal. However, there is the following
partial characterization result.
Proposition 18. Suppose that the output-maximizing match is (payoff-equivalent
to) segregation. Then the economy is segregated.
Proof. Suppose instead there is an equilibrium in which a positive measure of
agents get strictly more than their segregation payoffs. Since in any equilibrium
every type gets at least its segregation payoff, the aggregate equilibrium payoff
strictly exceeds the aggregate of the segregation payoffs. But this contradicts the
assumption that aggregate output is maximized by segregation. •
In particular, if the planner's "reduced-form" production function H(a, b) is
symmetric and supermodular, then the optimum will involve segregation (the
reasoning for this is analogous to that for Proposition 3), and therefore the equi-
librium will too.
The converse to Proposition 18 is obviously not true, as our example shows.
In that case, the reason that surplus maximizing matches are not achieved in
equilibrium stems from the limited transferability introduced by incentive prob-
lems. An a who is forced to match with a b receives less than his segregation
payoff; she cannot be compensated by the b because that would entail that the
b end up with less than an incentive-compatible share of output (recall that the
33For instance, consider the example with a linear cost function, a uniform distribution on
[a, a], and parameter values <p = 4, a = (4(\/5 4- 1)</>)1/4, a0 = (84>)1/4, a = ^ .
In equilibrium, agents below ao are idle and net output is -=^ J^ (b2-\-yfbA — &<i> — 2)db = 3.85
Negative matching on [ao, a] yields ^ ^ J^ (b(a-\-ao — b)-\-y/b2(a + ao — b)2 — 8(p—2)db = 3.91
But NAM on [a, a] yields ^ J*(b(a+a-b) 4- yjb2{a 4- a - b)2 - 80 - 2)db = 4.47
In this case, while there is a gain to matching negatively where the reduced-form produc-
tion function is submodular (namely on [ao,a] x [ao,a]), this is small compared to the gain of
employing the "unemployed" who are below ao (also in a negative assortative way).
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equilibrium is Pareto efficient, just not output maximizing). This would violate
feasibility. Thus, this simple example illustrates how a conflict between "cake
production" (maximizing the surplus generated by matches) and "cake division"
(maximizing one's share of a given surplus) can lead to distortions in the pattern
of matching.
More generally, the example demonstrates that even with knowledge of the
production technology that indicates that SEG (or PAM) ought to be the out-
come, and even with accompanying evidence to that effect, there need not be a
presumption that such a matching pattern is efficient.
4. Conclusion
The foregoing analysis suggests that the conclusions that have been drawn from
the basic matching model are vulnerable to misspecification. The financial market
example indicates that market imperfections may significantly change the patterns
of matching we observe, possibly making them very sensitive to the distribution of
types. Or, as the moral hazard example indicates, they may have very little effect
on matching, even if they have a large effect on economic outcomes. The general
point is that the conclusions one can draw from observing a matching pattern
— either about the underlying economic process or the efficiency of outcome —
may be very limited. In particular, the properties of the production technology
hardly suffice for making welfare evaluations on the basis of an observed matching
pattern or in predicting the outcome of the match.
The next step in the agenda is the search for conditions on the distribution of
types that will help characterize solutions for situations in which conditions like
P are violated. The analysis in Section 3.2.1 indicates this may be a challenging
task, but far from hopeless. In particular, optimization methods can be applied
to transferable utility cases, which as we have seen, include a number of imperfect
markets models.
This paper has focused on the effects of only one departure from the classical
environment on two-person matching without externalities. There are two others
which have received some attention recently, namely search frictions [26] and
multidimensional type spaces [7]; we comment briefly on the latter.
On the positive side, as we have remarked, Condition S and Proposition 2
apply almost without modification to multidimensional type spaces (as well as
to multiperson matches). It is possible to generalize the definitions of monotone
matching to this case, although the typical incompleteness of orders on the type
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space tend to make fully satisfactory definitions hard to come by.34
The multidimensional case introduces other difficulties. First of all, there is
a myriad of ways in which the various characteristics of the matching partners
might enter into their joint output. A most natural way to proceed is to suppose
that the characteristics can be summarized by a one-dimensional quantity (call
it "talent"). Output then depends on talent in the usual way. Talent is not
observable to the investigator, but (some of) the characteristics are (one thinks
of athletes, whose height and weight might be easy to measure but whose athletic
talent might require the appraisal of experts who match the athletes into teams).
But even in this restricted environment with two-person matches, it is easy to
find cases in which matching satisfies PAM in talent but appears as NAM in every
dimension observable to the investigator. The problem is that the joint distribu-
tion of characteristics leaves a degree of freedom that doesn't fully nail down the
matching pattern. Avoiding this predicament requires a weaker, statistical defi-
nition of PAM and related restrictions on the joint distribution of characteristics.
We discuss this in [19]. The point to emphasize is that one-dimensional models,
like perfect-markets models, entail special assumptions, and it is important to
have some idea just what those assumptions are and how strong they might be.
5. Appendix
5.1. A Note on Existence of Equilibrium
When / = 0, utility is transferable. By the maximum theorem and the imposed
conditions on the choice sets and the functions h and g, the maximized value of
the joint payoff is upper semicontinuous in types; as shown in [11], this ensures
that an equilibrium exists.
For the nontransferable case, things are slightly more involved. The first issue
is comprehensiveness of the characteristic function,35 which is generally essential
to ensuring nonemptiness of the core. While a mild condition in the case of perfect
markets (it amounts to being an assumption of free disposal), it is much less so
in the presence of incentive and/or contract ibility problems, since feasibility will
often entail that each agent receives a nonnegligible payoff (see Figure 3.6 for an
example). None of our results depend on comprehensiveness (except in instances
34See our earlier working paper [17] for a discussion of this point.
35
 V is comprehensive if for any set P, v £ V (P) implies that v' £ V (P) whenever v[ < V{ for
all i £ P.
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where it is already guaranteed by other assumptions).
For existence, the following construction suffices. Restrict attention to economies
in which the type distribution has finite support (the issue with a continuous type
distribution is possible failures of continuity of the characteristic function in type).
Define the comprehensive extension of a set V(-) as the smallest comprehensive
set containing V(-). The economy in which V is replaced by its comprehensive
extension will have a nonempty core [12]. Moreover, there will always exist core
allocations in the extended economy in which agents receive utility levels that are
on the Pareto frontier of the original feasible set V(-). Such allocations satisfy fea-
sibility, measure consistency, and the no blocking requirements of an equilibrium
of the original economy, and so the original economy has an equilibrium.
When Condition S is satisfied and V is comprehensive, then the segregation
payoff vector lies outside (or on the Pareto frontier) of V(-). Violations of this
condition entail that the segregation payoff vector lies in the interior of V(-). But
if V is not comprehensive, then segregation payoff vector may lie outside of V(-)
and still entail a violation of Condition S.
5.2. Proof of Proposition 4
(i) Assume that Condition PT is satisfied. Consider a > b > c > d and payoffs
such that
s(a) + s(d) = cr(a,d) (5.1)
s(b) + s(c) = a(b,c).
We will show that for any payoffs satisfying (5.1), a negative matching pat-
tern ({a, d} , {b, c}) cannot be stable. Since PT is satisfied, one of the two WID
inequalities holds. Assume without loss of generality that
a (a, d) + a (b, c) < a (a, b) + a (c, d). (5.2)
If either s (a) + s (b) < a (a, b) or s (c) + s (d) < a (c, d) , the negative matching
pattern ({a,d} , {b, c}) is not stable when the payoffs are s. Hence, there can be
negative matching in equilibrium only if s (a) + s (b) > a (a, b) and s (c) 4- s (d) >
cr(c,d). However, by using (5.2) it is immediate that both inequalities must be
equalities. Hence, the payoffs s also sustain the positive match ({a, b} , {c, d}).
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(ii) Consider an economy with three atoms of equal mass a > b > c. We show
that if PT is violated, i.e., if
a (a, b) + a (6, c) < a (a, c) (5.3)
PAM is violated in equilibrium. Consider payoffs s such that
s (a) = <r (a, 6) + e
s(c) = a (a, c) — a (a, b) — e
s(b) = 0.
where e <E (0, a (a, c) — a (a, 6)). Then, s (a) 4- s (c) = cr (a, c), s (a) + s (6) >
a (a, 6) and 5(6) + 5 (c) > <r (a, c) by (5.3). Hence the matching ({a, c} , {b})
together with s constitutes an equilibrium that violates PAM.
Consider now any a > b > c > d and suppose that PT is not satisfied. Hence,
a (a,d) > 0, and,
a (a, d) + a (b, c) > a (a, 6) + cr (c,d) (5.4)
a (a, d) + o (b, c) > a (o,c) + a (b,d) (5.5)
Consider now an economy with four atoms of equal measure at a, b, c, d. We show
that there is no equilibrium with positive matching; thus the equilibrium must
exhibit negative matching.
There are positive matches in which some types segregate. Clearly, segregation




ra4 = ({a, 6} ,{c,d})
mb = {{a,c} ,{
Clearly, m\ and 7712 are dominated by 771,4 (if ^ 4 cannot be an equilibrium
match, neither can mi and 777-2). ^ 3 cannot be an equilibrium since a(a,d) > 0
(this also explain the use of the condition a (a,d) > 0). Hence, we are left with
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777.4 and ra5. The argument is the same for both, so we prove only the result for
m4.
Suppose by way of contradiction that ra4 is an equilibrium match for the
economy. Then there is a payoff s such that
s (a) + s (b) = a (a, b)
s (c) + s (d) = a (c, d).
However, by (5.4), s (a) + s (b) + s (c) + s (d) < a (a, d) + a (6, c) . Hence either
5 (a) + 5 (d) < a (a,d) or s (b) + s (c) < a (b,c) which means that for any payoff,
there is beneficial deviation by a coalition. Since matching cannot be positive
in equilibrium, the negative assortative matching ({a, d] , {6, c}) (this is the only
other possible matching) is the unique equilibrium matching pattern.
5.3. Proof of Proposition 10
We prove part (i) only, as the proof of (ii) is similar. Suppose that Condition P is
violated. That is, consider a > b > c > d and payoffs s (a), s (b) , s (c) and s (d)
with s E Sp (a, d) X Sp (6, c) and such that the following conditions hold:
(a) a (a) > p a b (s (b)) , 8 ( a ) > (3ac (s ( c ) ) y s (d) > [3db (s ( & ) ) , s (d) > (3dc (s ( c ) )
( b ) [either s (a) > J5ah (s (b)) or s (d) > (5dc {s (c))]
(c) [either s (a) > 0ac (s (c)) or s (d) > (3db (s (6))].
Note that since s € Sp (a,d) x Sp (6,c),
^ ^ ( a ) ] (5.6)
s(b) = &c(*(c))€ [0,^(6)1
Condition (a) is implied by the core condition for s G Sp (a, d) x Sp (6, c). Indeed,
the original core condition implies that (s (a) ,s(b)) ^ SD (a, b); hence, it must
be that the vector (s (a) , s (b)) is "outside" the set SD (a, b). However, since both
s (a) and s (b) are nonnegative, this implies that (s (a) , s (b)) is also "outside" the
extension of the set SD (a, b), i.e., that s (a) > j3ab (s (&)). Note that this is true
for any extension. The other inequalities in (a)-(c) are derived following the same
logic.
We show that (b) implies that s (d) < (5da o (3ab o /3bc o (5cd (s (d)) and that (c)
implies that s (d) < Pda°Pac°Pcb°Pbd (s W) J hence that condition P* is violated.
In (b), suppose first that s (a) > j3ab (s (b)). By (5.6) and strict monotonicity
of /3, we have the following sequence
8(0) > A* («(&))
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-H- f3ad(s(d))>0ab°l3bc(s(c))





=*• s (a) > (5abo(3hco(3cd{s{d))
^ s(d)<Pdaof3aboPbcoPcd(
Now, in (c), if 5 (a) > (3ac (s (c)), we have
If s (a) = (3ac (s (c)), then (c) requires that s (d) > fddb (s (b)), we then have,
s(d) > f3db(
« •
Since s (a) = j3ac (s (c)), ^od (5 (d)) = /?ac (s (c)) the previous inequality and the




Therefore, (b) and (c) imply a violation of condition P* for any extension (3. This
proves that if there exists one extension j3 such that Condition P* holds, then
Condition P also holds. This concludes the proof.
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5.4. Proof of Corollary 1
We prove (i), as the proof of (ii) is similar. For any t and t and v < £t£, let
s = v - u (i) , (pti (£) = Ett- - u (i) , and
a (9) = f 7t£ (* + u (t)) -u(t) i£s< 4>ti {t)
I 4>u (*) - 5 otherwise
Observe that /3 satisfies (2.4) since jt£ (s + u {t^j is strictly decreasing and since
the boundary conditions are met. Also, for any a > b > c > d, (j)ad (d) > 0.
Therefore, the requirements in Condition N* are satisfied. We show that (2.9)-
(2.10) imply (2.7)-(2.8) of Proposition 10 when applied to /3.
Let s < (j)cd (d) and suppose that (2.7) does not hold for j3. Since (3 is strictly
decreasing, we have,
Using recursively the definition of j3, we have:
and
It follows that 76a o 7 ^ (s + u(d)) < j b c o 7cd (5 + w (d)) which violates (2.9) for
v = s -\- u(d) since 5 < (f)cd (d) implies that s + u(d) < Ticd- Similar reasoning
shows that (2.10) implies (2.8).
5.5. Proof of Proposition 15
(i) The measure of heterogeneous matches is, for a < b*,
0 if a < yf(j)k
(, - \ J 21oga-log((/»fc) -r - _^ r rrr *] ,„ _x
M(^f l , f l ) = { loga-ioga i t a e [ V 0 « , a J (5.7)
log a—log a
On a E (y/4>k, a*) , M ^ ~' ^s ProPortional to log f ^  J which is positive since
a < y/^k. Hence, the index of segregation 1 — /1 decreases as a increases on
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this interval. On a > \/<fik, fi((fi,a,a) is clearly decreasing in a, and segregation
increases for these values; in the limit, as a —-» oo, / i(^,a, a) —• 0. A similar
argument can be used for any value of a as long as a < y/(fik. (If a > y/(fik,
(i (<fi,a, a) — 0 for any a).
(ii) Since a is the parameter of interest, we write fi (a) for fi ((fi, aa: ad). Since
there is a multiplicative shift of the support, the density of a is still
 lo °*lio
on [ao,aa]. Direct application of Proposition 14 leads to the following values for
fi(a)
.fi  Q <log a—log a — 2</>— 1 a
\o) :c a*
logo-logo "^ [20-1 a ' a
0 if a > ^
— a
-i
2<p— 1 a ' a '
yielding the result.
5.6. Proof of Proposition 16
To simplify the writing, let /3 = ^. Since (fi is the parameter of interest we write
fJ>(4>) for ji((fi,a,~a). Without loss of generality, assume that a = \fk\ hence,
a — [3\/k, where (3 > 1. Note that for (fi > 1, a < y/tf>k, hence as long as (fi < (32,
a > \/^k1 and O is non empty, which implies that fi ((fi) is positive, (fi* = \ {fi2 + l)
is the unique solution to the equation in (fi, a = y(2(fi — 1) k. Then, in the notation
I— ih Pk
of Proposition 14, since a = \Jk, a is less than b* = tZ_1 for any (fi > 1 and it
follows that b = b*. Since a = a* when (fi = <fi*, a = a* if (fi < (fi* and a = a when
(fi > (fi*. Observing that log a — log a = (log/? — 1) ^ |^ , and that log a — log ^ =
(log/? — log (fi) logk, it follows that
if * e [!(/? +1),/?]
Clearly, /i ((fi) is decreasing (so that segregation 1 — (i[<fi) is increasing) on
[\ (fi2 + l) , 01] and increasing on (l, \ (/32 + l)) , yielding the result.
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